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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the European Union’s approach to crisis management and compares 
the three most recent operations, EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, and 
EUNAVFOR Somalia, as case studies. It finds that the European Union has reached a 
common understanding of comprehensive security, but it has failed to develop and 
implement a truly integrated approach at the political and strategic level. The thesis 
identifies three decisive factors for the improvement of the EU’s comprehensive 
approach to security. First, the European Union needs a sound concept through which its 
plethora of civil and military tools could be seamlessly integrated and synchronized in a 
truly coherent approach. Second, the European Union could benefit from the 
establishment of a permanent Operation Headquarters providing the requested input from 
the very beginning of the comprehensive planning process. Third, the EU’s security and 
defense policy could become more coherent and capable if small groups of credible 
nations cooperated to offer leadership, perhaps in informal directorates. The key question 
in this respect remains whether and how the European Union can address the friction 
between the need for effective leadership on the one hand and the imperative of political 
legitimacy on the other. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE 
Since 2003, when the first EU-led military operation was launched, the European 
Union (EU) has developed a broader understanding of comprehensive security as a policy 
implementation challenge. This broader understanding underlies the judgment that the 
establishment of a safe and secure environment in a specific country will not only be 
effected by military and diplomatic means, but also by such other activities as economic 
reconstruction, state building, environmental protection, and human and gender rights 
enforcement. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the international military 
engagements in the Balkans and in Africa, have confirmed the judgment that a 
comprehensive approach to security can add value to military operations in order to meet 
political requirements and to achieve sustained success. In other words, civil 
contributions to military operations can significantly increase the effectiveness of an 
intervention. The comprehensive approach to security has therefore been the focus of 
much attention within the framework of the EU’s security and defense policy as well as 
in other international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the United Nations (UN). Simultaneously, the idea of comprehensive 
security has become a widely discussed topic within the academic community.   
While the importance of comprehensive security has been increasingly 
recognized, its implementation remains a practical challenge. In this respect, it has been 
repeatedly argued that the European Union is particularly well-suited to implement a 
comprehensive approach to security because it possesses a unique combination of 
political, economic, humanitarian, military, and other instruments. In fact, since the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was launched in 1999, the European 
Union has emerged with a dual character as both a civilian power and a security actor in 
international politics.1 It has furthermore gained a broad range of experience in more 
 
1 The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is the successor of the ESDP under the Lisbon 
Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009. 
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than twenty civil and military operations in Europe, Africa, and Asia. However, the 
incorporation of civil means in military operations leads to a number of obstacles and 
difficulties at the strategic level as well as in theatre. Against this background, an 
examination of EU-led military operations can illuminate the weak links in the 
implementation of a comprehensive approach to security and convey a broader 
understanding of its challenges in order to add value to future military operations. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The broad range of literature about security studies and security concepts reflects 
the fundamental changes in international politics since 1989 and underscores the 
increasing importance of the comprehensive security issue with regard to regional 
security. Even though policy-makers and scholars developed the idea of comprehensive 
security more than sixty years ago, during the Cold War, security was seen as reliant 
mainly on defense and military forces. This close relationship led to a focused approach 
to security that did not set priorities on social, economic, humanitarian, or additional 
aspects. In this respect, some observers defined security as consisting mainly of “freedom 
from fear” of military aggression. This limited definition of security as a reliable defense 
and deterrence posture against a military threat was a product of the bipolar conflict 
between two nuclear superpowers.  
Accordingly, during the Cold War, Western security policy was molded under the 
leadership of the United States, mostly within the framework of NATO. This alliance 
mainly provided collective defense. The Helsinki process, launched in 1973 with the 
initiation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), led to a 
more comprehensive view of security, reflected in the three baskets of the Helsinki Final 
Act. It expanded the scope of Western security policy by focusing on a number of 
specific issues, but it did not challenge the primacy of military defense and deterrence. 
Thus, the CSCE and its successor, the OSCE, failed to emerge as the leading security 
organization for the Euro-Atlantic region in practice.2   
 
2 David Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies 23, no. 1 (1997), 5; Sven 
Biscop, The European Security Strategy (London: Ashgate, 2005), 1–4. 
 3
                                                
The limited definition of security was questioned with the breakdown of the 
Eastern bloc and the end of the Soviet Union. Faced with the probability of new conflicts 
in the Balkans, Africa, and the Middle East, the export of security and stability to these 
regions moved to the forefront of Western foreign and security policies. The dichotomy 
and the linkage between external and internal security has become more widely discussed 
in the last twenty years. It has furthermore created a general understanding of a 
comprehensive approach to security and stability as a part of overall policy. With regard 
to this issue, three main categories of literature can be distinguished. 
The first category consists of analyses of different security concepts in general. 
Since 1989, liberal as well as realist scholars have largely accepted that a broader 
understanding of security and stability is needed than that which was dominant in 
Western foreign and security policy circles during the Cold War.3 Reflecting this, the 
2005 UN Human Development Report cited former US Secretary of State Edward R. 
Stettinius, who stated with regard to security challenges in 1945 that the 
battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security 
front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the 
economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. 
Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace.4  
While a broad definition of security in general is accepted today, there are still 
different approaches to security. Even though these approaches target the same 
objectives, they choose different centers of gravity and emphasize different means. The 
 
3 Andrea Ellner, “Regional Security in a Global Context: A Critical Appraisal of European 
Approaches to Security,” European Security 17, no. 1 (2008), 9.; Rolando Moschini, “The Comprehensive 
Security Concept of the European Union,” in Globalization and Environmental Challenges: 
Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century, ed. Hans Gunter Brauch (Berlin and New York: Springer, 
2008), 651–657; Z. Selden, “Stabilization and Democratization: Renewing the Transatlantic Alliance,” 
Parameters 37, no. 4 (2007), 85; Pernille Rieker, “From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security: 
Towards the Europeanization of French Foreign and Security Policy?” Security Dialogue 37, no. 4 (2006), 
509–528; Bjorn Moller, “Comprehensive Security in East Asia – as Viewed in the Light of the European 
Experience. A Case for Cooperative Security,” Politologiske Studier 4, no. 1 (2001), 86–87; Baldwin, The 
Concept of Security, 5; Helga Haftendorn, “The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building 
in International Security,” International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 1 (1991), 3; Stephen M. Walt, “Mershon 
Series: The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (1991), 211. 
4 Stettinius quoted in United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2005: 
International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 12. 
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concept of human security advocates the comprehensive protection of human beings and 
aims to universalize respect for human rights. It was originally developed within the 
framework of the UN Development Program and has subsequently been adopted by 
Canada and Japan.5 In particular, the case of Japan proved that this concept can facilitate 
the establishment of safety and stability in certain areas.6 With regard to military 
operations, however, the implementation of a human security approach seems to be a 
huge challenge. In the short run, the intended export of norms, for example, can lead to 
substantial difficulties in failed or failing states. Andrea Ellner hence argues that “the 
approach has weaknesses in concept and practice which potentially undermine the 
normative aspirations”7 of international actors. Therefore, the concept of human security 
should primarily be seen as an element of long-term development policy. The civilian 
aspects of the EU’s approach to comprehensive security are closely linked to this 
concept.8 
The concept of environmental security has achieved increasing recognition among 
scholars in the last fifteen years. While it is frequently maintained that environmental 
change—including climate change and pollution caused by human activities—can be 
evaluated as a security threat or, at least, as a source of security threat, Nils Petter 
Gleditsch argues that empirical studies are not able to provide evidence for this 
hypothesis.9 Be that as it may, environmental security studies are devoting increased 
attention to causes and effects of war linked to global environmental changes. Even if “a 
 
5 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 226. 
6 Astrid Suhrke, “Human Security and the Interests of States,” Security Dialogue 30, no. 3 (1999), 
265–276; Roland Paris, “Human Security,” International Security 26, no. 2 (2001), 87; J. Matlary, “Much 
Ado about Little: The EU and Human Security,” International Affairs 84, no. 1 (2008), 131. 
7 Ellner, Regional Security in a Global Context: A Critical Appraisal of European Approaches to 
Security, 9. 
8 Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 201–203. 
9 Hans Günter Brauch, Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in 
the 21st Century (Berlin; New York: Springer, 2008), 1147; Braden R. Allenby, “Environmental Security: 
Concept and Implementation,” International Political Science Review 21, no. 1 (2000), 5; Nina Graeger, 
“Review Essay: Environmental Security?” Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (1996), 109; Nils Petter 
Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature,” Journal of Peace Research 
35, no. 3 (1998), 381. 
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fundamental paradigmatic shift in security thinking is needed during the 21st century,”10 
the ability of military forces to cope with environmental security dangers is limited. 
Therefore, the recent concept, as it stands, does not offer an applicable approach for 
peacekeeping and stabilization operations in the short run.  
Nevertheless, the idea of environmental security is related to the development of a 
further key concept, which emerged also out of debates within the United Nations: the 
theory of global public goods (GPG). According to this concept, certain material and 
nonmaterial goods are universal in the sense that every human being is entitled to them. 
These goods are public because their provision is subject to the responsibility of state 
authorities at different levels of administration. In this regard, private suppliers and the 
market cannot substitute for the state. The GPG are essentially comprised of physical 
security and stability, the rule of law, an open and inclusive economic order, general 
well-being, health, education, and a clean environment. These goods are interdependent 
and cannot be provided without each other. Because the core GPG are equally important, 
crisis management efforts have to address all of them in order to reach sustainable long-
term solutions for international conflicts.11 Therefore, only a comprehensive approach to 
crisis management involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments is able to 
provide an effective response to the changed security environment.  
The second category of works surveys the European Union as a regional security 
organization. Since the launch of the ESDP in 1999, the number of published works has 
significantly increased. While it is widely accepted that the European Union has 
successfully transformed its role from that of a pure civil power to a considerable military 
security actor in the world, there is a wide-ranging debate regarding the assessment of 
 
10 Brauch, Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st 
Century, 947. 
11 Marco A. Ferroni and Ashoka Mody, International Public Goods: Incentives, Measurement, and 
Financing (Boston, MA; Washington, DC: Kluwer Academic Publishers; World Bank, 2002), 6. 
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this transformation.12 Consequently, among scholars, the transformed European Union is 
fundamentally differently characterized as an “ethical actor,”13 or—possibly—as a 
“tragic actor,”14 as a “normative empire,”15 a “transformative power,”16 or a “regional 
normative hegemon,”17 and, last but not least, as a “small power,”18 or a “global 
actor.”19 One reason for the varying descriptions is the elusive and unique character of 
the European Union. Some EU policies are determined on a supranational basis, while 
others involve intergovernmental decision making. Therefore, the adoption of categories 
like power, empire and hegemony has enriched the discussion, even though theoretically 
grounded empirical research remains scarce. 
Several characteristics distinguish the European Union from international actors 
such as China, Russia, or the United States. One crucial characteristic is the complex and 
time-consuming decision-making process. Even though it is caused by the need for 
appropriate participation by twenty-six of the EU’s twenty-seven sovereign member 
 
12 Seth G. Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 301; Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 315; 
Stephanie Anderson and Thomas R. Seitz, “European Security and Defense Policy Demystified: Nation-
Building and Identity in the European Union,” Armed Forces and Society 33, no. 1 (2006), 24; A. Bailes, 
“The EU and a 'Better World': What Role for the European Security and Defence Policy?” International 
Affairs 84, no. 1 (2008), 115; C. Gebhard, “European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation 
Perspective,” Journal of Common Market Studies 46, no. 4 (2008), 900; Gunther Hauser and Franz Kernic, 
European Security in Transition (London: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), 180; Anand Menon, 
“Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten,” International Affairs 85, no. 2 (2009), 227. 
13 Lisbeth Aggestam, A European Foreign Policy? Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in 
Britain, France and Germany (Stockholm: Stockholm University, Department of Political Science, 2004), 
241. 
14 Adrian Hyde-Price, “A 'Tragic Actor'? A Realist Perspective on 'Ethical Power Europe',” 
International Affairs 84, no. 1 (2008), 29–44. 
15 Zaki Laidi, “The Normative Empire: The Unintended Consequences of European Power,” Garnet 
Policy Brief 6 (2008), www.garnet-
eu.org/fileadmin/documents/policy_briefs/Garnet_Policy_Brief_No_6.pdf (accessed 28 July 2009). 
16 Mark Leonard, Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century (London: Fourth Estate, 2005), 5. 
17 Hiski Haukkala, “The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European 
Neighbourhood Policy,” Europe–Asia Studies 60, no. 9 (2008), 1601–1622. 
18 Asle Toje, “The European Union as a Small Power, Or Conceptualizing Europe's Strategic 
Actorness,” Journal of European Integration 30, no. 2 (2008), 199–215. 
19 Jan Zielonka, “Europe as a Global Actor: Empire by Example?” International Affairs 84, no. 3 
(2008), 471–484. 
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states20 and a multiplicity of relevant EU bodies, it may be one of the explanations for 
the EU’s reluctance to engage in power politics.21 Until late 1998, the United Kingdom 
opposed EU involvement in military security matters. Nevertheless, since the ESDP was 
launched in 1999, the European Union has successfully conducted more than twenty civil 
and military operations in Europe, Africa and Asia. Furthermore, it has developed a 
unique security culture reflecting the need for a comprehensive approach to security. In 
this respect, some analysts have concluded that adding value to peacekeeping or 
stabilization operations is more difficult than originally expected.22  
The third category of pertinent literature, that dealing with EU-led military 
operations, is much less extensive. Most works examine long-completed or long-standing 
operations—for example, Operation Althea, which the European Union took over from 
NATO under the “Berlin plus” arrangement in 2004.23 In contrast, there are only a few 
works on recently conducted autonomous EU-led military operations. While some 
publications examine EUFOR RD Congo,24 in particular the difficult decision-making 
and force generation process, a significant shortfall remains concerning the last two 
 
20 With regard to the EU’s security and defense policy, there are only twenty-six member states 
involved because Denmark does not participate in this policy area. 
21 Toje, The European Union as a Small Power, Or Conceptualizing Europe's Strategic Actorness, 
199–215. 
22 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “The ESDP and Civilian Rapid Reaction: Adding Value is Harder than 
Expected,” European Security 15, no. 3 (2006), 299; T. Muehlmann, “EU Civil–Military Cooperation and 
the Fight Against Organised Crime: Lessons to be Learned from the Bosnian Example,” European Security 
17, no. 2/3 (2008), 387; Ursula C. Schroder, “Security Expertise in the European Union: The Challenges of 
Comprehensiveness and Accountability,” European Security 15, no. 4 (2006), 471. 
23 Among other sources, see Cornelius Friesendorf and Susan E. Penksa, “Militarized Law 
Enforcement in Peace Operations: EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” International Peacekeeping 15, 
no. 5 (2008), 677–694; Muehlmann, EU Civil–Military Cooperation and the Fight Against Organised 
Crime: Lessons to be Learned from the Bosnian Example, 387; Jakobsen, The ESDP and Civilian Rapid 
Reaction: Adding Value is Harder than Expected, 299.  
24 Jan Ryjacek, “The Decision-Making Process on the Deployment of German Armed Forces for 
Protecting the Elections in Congo,” Zeitschrift Fur Parlamentsfragen 39, no. 2 (2008), 219–232; Tarik 
Soylemis, “European Security and Defense Policy and its Three Critical Missions: Macedonia, Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Bosnia Missions,” Uluslararasi Hukuk Ve Politika 3, no. 12 (2007), 39–51; Romain 
Yakemtchouk, “The European Union Faced with the Democratic Republic of the Congo – the “Eufor R. D. 
Congo” Operation,” Revue Du Marche Commun Et De l'Union Europeenne, no. 501 (2006), 512–518; 
Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “What is the EU in Congo? The European Africa-Strategy between Symbolism, 
Material Politics and Cosmopolitan Engagement,” Internationale Politik 61, no. 6 (2006), 84–89; Richard 
Gowan, “The EU's Multiple Strategic Identities: European Security After Lebanon and the Congo,” Studia 
Diplomatica 60, no. 1 (2007), 59–80; Peter Schmidt, “Volunteers, Forward!” Internationale Politik 61, no. 
11 (2006), 68–77. 
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operations: EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EUNAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta).25 In 
addition, the existing literature does not analyze these operations in light of the EU 
approach to comprehensive security.  
In a nutshell, the current status of research is disparate. While there is a consensus 
that a broader understanding of security is needed in order to export security and stability 
to neighboring regions, a number of competing security concepts are under consideration. 
The debate focuses in particular on the merits and shortcomings of these concepts in 
practice. Nevertheless, a significant gap in the literature remains regarding the EU 
approach to comprehensive security and its effectiveness in military operations. 
C. MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis examines to what extent the European Union has achieved a 
comprehensive approach to security, assesses how the pursuit of this approach has 
affected the success of its operations to date at the strategic level, and derives lessons for 
future operations. In order to obtain a broad analysis taking various relevant factors into 
account, a number of sub-questions are addressed: First, the thesis identifies the chief 
characteristics of comprehensive security with regard to EU-led military operations. 
Second, it investigates how the EU crisis management procedures deal with civil and 
military contributions to ESDP operations. Third, it explores the political and strategic 
planning process, with particular regard to the EU’s approach to comprehensive security 
before the launch of the operations examined in this thesis. Finally, it assesses to what 
extent this approach has contributed to the conduct and effectiveness of EU-led military 
operations. The objective in answering these questions is to prepare an analysis of the 
decisive factors for the improvement of a comprehensive approach to security in future 
operations. 
 
25 Romain Yakemtchouk, “The European EUFOR Force in Chad and in the Central African 
Republic,” Revue Du Marche Commun Et De l'Union Europeenne, no. 519 (2008), 365–369; Denis M. 
Tull, The Chad Crisis and Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2008), 
4; E. Hermans and S. van der Meer, “EUFOR in Chad,” Militaire Spectator 177, no. 7–8 (2008), 403–409; 
Stefan Brune, “Controversial Peacekeeping Operations – Europe, France and Chad,” WeltTrends, no. 64 
(2009), 19–23; Felix Arteaga, The Chad Conflict, United Nations (MINURCAT) and the European Union 
(EUFOR) (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estrategicos, 2008), 9; Daisy R. 
Khalifa, “No Smooth Sailing: Surge in Piracy Off Somalia Draws International Naval Response,” 
Seapower 52, no. 2 (2009), 18–22. 
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Three hypotheses guide the research. The first is that a lack of agreement on 
sound concepts hampers the implementation of a comprehensive approach within the 
ESDP. An agreed concept seems to be a precondition for reaching a common 
understanding among civil and military actors in order to add value to military 
operations. The second is that the absence of appropriate EU crisis management 
procedures weakens the effectiveness of the EU’s efforts to promote comprehensive 
security. The implementation of a broad range of civil means in EU-led military 
operations therefore needs to be incorporated in the planning and decision-making 
process at the political and strategic level. The third hypothesis is that the lack of close 
civil-military planning and coordination across EU bodies and agencies weakens the 
overall effectiveness of the EU’s efforts. The conduct and effectiveness of a 
comprehensive approach to security in EU-led military operations seem to be 
significantly affected by the organization and interaction of ESDP-relevant bodies. 
D. METHODOLOGY, SOURCES, AND THESIS OUTLINE 
The EU’s approach to comprehensive security and its effectiveness in military 
operations are examined in two parts. The first part (Chapter II) focuses on 
conceptualizing comprehensive security with regard to the European Union, and 
evaluates the planning and decision-making process for ESDP/CSDP, based on 
qualitative content analysis. In this context, different theoretical models such as realism 
and constructivism are employed to the extent that these models seem able to contribute 
to a better understanding. The sources are mainly official documents issued by security 
and defense-relevant EU bodies as well as works by European and American scholars.  
The second part (Chapter III) employs the method of a structured and focused 
comparison. The three most recent EU-led military operations, EUFOR RD Congo, 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA, and EUNAVFOR Somalia, are compared as case studies. Each case 
is examined concerning its political and strategic context, the planning and decision-
making process, the conduct of operations, and the results at the political and strategic 
level. (The operational effects are not considered.) The outcomes of each case are then 
compared in order to analyze similarities, differences, and changes with regard to the 
 10
EU’s approach to comprehensive security and its effectiveness. The research is based on 
primary sources of the European Union and its member states, secondary literature from 
scholarly books and journals, and—due to the subject’s topicality—articles from 
newspapers. Finally, conclusions are presented in Chapter IV. The conclusions are based 
on an analysis of the decisive factors for the improvement of a comprehensive approach 





                                                
II. THE EU’S APPROACH TO COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The idea of comprehensive security is certainly not an invention of the European 
Union. Scholars and policy-makers developed the concept in the context of the United 
Nations in response to the changing international security environment after the end of 
the Cold War. The idea has increasingly shaped the strategic thinking of nation states and 
international organizations such as the European Union, NATO, and the OSCE.26 In 
particular, the peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations of NATO have provided 
evidence that “ambitious goals such as democratization and sustainable security can only 
be achieved through economic and political development.”27    
Accordingly, comprehensive security relies on a broader definition of security, 
one that is far more extensive than traditional, state-centric and defense-oriented political-
military approaches. The idea is closely linked to different new concepts such as human 
security, global public goods, and cooperative security. The underlying assumption of 
these new concepts is that security is indivisible. No country is secure as long as other 
countries are insecure. Hence, the term “security” stands for the precise opposite of 
“defense” with its security dilemma, whereby a country’s security arises from its 
neighbor’s weakness and insecurity. This notion of collective security forms the basis of 
the strategic thinking behind the EU’s security and defense policy and its comprehensive 
approach to crisis management.28 
Comprehensive security calls for a holistic and normative approach to crisis 
management, and it attempts to operationalize multiple dimensions of security. As with 
the concept of human security, the individual is the main point of reference, not the 
 
26 Biscop, The European Security Strategy, 3–5. 
27 David S. Yost, NATO and International Organizations (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2007), 176. 
28 Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson, The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a 
Global Europe (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 8–13; Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the 
European Union, 200. 
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state.29 Key aspects of activity can thereby vary due to the security situation and the 
threat assessment. Nevertheless, the main idea of this concept is “the integration of lines 
of activity between the military, economic, political, and judicial components, as well as 
the police.”30 As a result, the improvement of stability and security in crisis regions 
depends on cross-departmental and interagency cooperation at the national level as well 
as on close collaboration among the various national, international, and non-
governmental stakeholders relevant to security issues in crisis regions.31 
This chapter examines the EU’s approach to comprehensive security. It first 
discusses the nature and the purpose of the EU’s security and defense policy from 
different theoretical points of view. It then explores how the European Union has adopted 
the idea of comprehensive security and to what extent it has developed a practical 
concept for crisis management operations and overseas missions. 
B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE CONCEPT OF 
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY 
1.  A Nascent Common Security Culture?  
Since 1999, when the European Union first articulated the objective of pursuing a 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), a substantial discussion has taken place 
with regard to the nature and purpose of the entire project. One of the main questions 
concerns the extent to which the development of the ESDP has contributed to the 
 
29 Biscop and Andersson, The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a Global Europe, 9. 
30 “Interview with Lieutenant General David Leakey, Director-General of the EU Military Staff,” 
NATO Review, 2007, no. 2, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/interview.html (accessed 
12 March 2010).  
31 Moschini, The Comprehensive Security Concept of the European Union, 651–657; Philip H. 
Gordon, “Western Europe; the Rise of European Security Cooperation.” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 6 (2007), 
192; Lars-Erik Lundin and Kyriakos Revelas, “Security and Democracy: From the Perspective of 
Commission Officials Working at the Interface between ESDP and Community External Action,” 
European Security 15, no. 4 (2006), 423; Selden, Stabilization and Democratization: Renewing the 
Transatlantic Alliance, 85; H. Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond,” 
European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 3 (2007), 357; A. Tusicisny, “Security Communities 
and their Values: Taking Masses Seriously,” International Political Science Review 28, no. 4 (2007), 425; 
Charlie Edwards, National Security for the Twenty-First Century (London: Demos, 2007), 119; Ken Gude 
and Ian Kearns, The New Front Line: Security in a Changing World (Washington, DC; London: Institute 
for Public Policy Research, 2008), 42. 
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emergence of a common security culture in the European Union.32 In this respect, 
opinion is deeply divided between those analysts who stress increasing elements of 
convergence and those who emphasize persistent and substantial differences between EU 
member states. This cleavage has a number of causes, but it reflects, inter alia, two 
distinct theoretical perspectives of the European Union and its external actions.33 
On the one hand, analysts from the realist school of international relations theory 
tend to look upon the process of international cooperation—including within the 
European Union—as a traditional business of inter-state bargaining that relies on the 
promotion of national interests. From that point of view, self-interested state actors push 
cooperation in policy areas in which states achieve and maintain “relative capabilities 
sufficient to remain secure and independent in the self-help context of international 
anarchy.”34 Social actors other than states can contribute to the bargaining at the 
international level, but the most important decisions are ultimately taken by the states. 
That particularly applies to the foreign, security, and defense policies that realist scholars 
consider the strongest bastion of national sovereignty.35 For proponents of this state-
based framework, the intergovernmental coordination in the EU’s security and defense 
policy is a significant constraint and the emergence of a common security culture is 
“almost impossible” as long as the national interests of member states remain different.36 
These national differences concern crucial aspects of the ESDP/CSDP such as the use of 
force, the projection of power, and the legitimacy of intervention. Accordingly, 
 
32 Nicole Gnesotto, “For a common European security culture,” WEU–ISS, Newsletter, no. 31 
(October 2000), 1. According to Nicole Gnesotto, a common security culture can be defined as “the aim 
and the means to incite common thinking, compatible reactions, coherent analysis – in short, a strategic 
culture that is increasingly European, one that transcends the different national security cultures and 
interests.”    
33 Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 179–181. 
34 Joseph M. Grieco, “Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of 
Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The 
Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 303. 
35 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 251; 
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 555. 
36 Julian Lindley-French, “In the Shade of Locarno? Why European Defence is Failing,” International 
Affairs 78, no. 4 (2002), 790. 
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significant problems with EU-led military operations are related to the deep divisions 
between member states, in terms of their approaches to security.37  
In spite of this, EU member states have carried forward the process of 
coordinating their foreign, security, and defense policies. Even realist scholars admit that 
military coordination and integration, e.g., within the framework of NATO, have created 
a considerable gain in security for the participating states by closing the gap between 
security requirements and national resources. They argue that collective defense enables 
the allies to diminish duplication and overlap and that it can offer efficiencies and 
economies of scale as long as there is a common threat perception and substantive 
cooperation. Nonetheless, military coordination and integration remain a kind of zero-
sum game for the participating states. Higher contributions from certain member states 
mean that less effort is required from other member states.38 From a realist point of view, 
ESDP/CSDP planning and decision-making are best understood as a bargaining process 
that both encourages and restrains competition over the distribution of burdens and 
benefits among member states. In this context, the unanimity requirement of the EU’s 
crisis management procedures helps to explain the lack of ambition of the ESDP 
according to the rule “the lower the level of commitment, the higher the likelihood of 
achieving consensus.”39 
On the other hand, scholars from the constructivist school view international 
relations in more value-based or normative terms. They argue that cooperation for joint 
gains between self-interested actors seems possible and paves the way for a concept of 
collective security. Six decades of security cooperation (1950–2010) between West 
European countries have modified a positive interdependence into a new collective 
security identity, which shapes the definition of self-interests, among other things.  
Therefore, participating states seem able to overcome competition and achieve increased 
 
37 Menon, Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten, 237–238. 
38 Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2003), 5–13; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 
321; Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, no. 2 
(Autumn 1993), 44–79. 
39 Asle Toje, “The Consensus-Expectations Gap: Explaining Europe's Ineffective Foreign Policy,” 
Security Dialogue 39, no. 1 (February 2008), 132. 
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cooperation and integration through continuing and increasingly extensive (yet relatively 
stable) social practices. In other words, socially constructed state identities and perceived 
national interests are central determinants of state behavior and of assessments of 
international politics.40 
Furthermore, in contrast to realist wisdom, constructivist scholars argue that 
national policies tend to adopt norms defined by international institutions to which they 
are closely linked. Some analysts detect clear signs of convergence between the national 
security cultures of EU member states. They argue that the process of movement towards 
a trans-European security culture concerns key aspects of the EU’s security and defense 
policy such as military capacity, reliability, legitimacy, and civil-military integration. 
This progress has taken place despite the fact that an EU-wide identity is still absent.41  
According to constructivist analysis, the changing security environment since the 
end of the Cold War has forced the security cooperation between the EU member states. 
The EU’s security and defense policy has relied on the common perception that the 
multilateral projection of armed forces and a mix of civil and military crisis management 
tools are needed in order to address the changing security threats. While the EU’s 
institutions mediate adaptation pressures from the international environment, the 
requirements of the common European security and defense policy offer the national 
governments the opportunity to communicate shared assessments to their domestic 
publics. In other words, because the EU’s security and defense policy is by definition a 
cooperative endeavor and a frame of common reference, it produces collective 
 
40 Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 562; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 429; Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what 
States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 
1992), 391–425. 
41 Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, “The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress 
Report,” International Affairs 81, no. 4 (2005), 801–820; Giovanni Grevi, “Framing the European Strategic 
Debate,” Studia Diplomatica 61, no. 3 (2008), 5–18; Christoph O. Meyer, “Convergence Towards a 
European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms,” European 
Journal of International Relations 11, no. 4 (2005), 523–549; Rieker, From Common Defence to 
Comprehensive Security: Towards the Europeanization of French Foreign and Security Policy? 509–528. 
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expectations for behavior. These expectations can impose pressure upon national security 
and defense policies in order to adopt emerging EU norms.42 
However, adaptation pressures do not necessarily overcome ideational 
divergences between the national and the EU levels. In particular, when there is an 
implicit or explicit incompatibility with significant national norms, the adoption of EU 
norms appears unrealistic—at least in the short run. In contrast, convergence is 
unnecessary when ideational inconsistencies are absent. Constructivist scholars therefore 
expect the “Europeanization” of security culture in areas in which medium adaptation 
pressure exists.43 There has been significant convergence in terms of threat perceptions 
among EU member states, for example. The importance of territorial defense has 
decreased for those EU member states that perceive no external military threat. That, in 
turn, has increased the acceptance of humanitarian interventions and the legitimacy of 
democracy promotion. In addition, despite some nuances in detail, both between EU 
member states and between national policy-makers and their publics, there has also been 
overall convergence with regard to the need for “UN authorization, multilateralism, and a 
rule-based order.”44 
Nevertheless, the degree of adaptation pressure differs between the EU member 
states. Among larger countries, the Federal Republic of Germany has faced the most 
pressure to modify its security culture. While the security culture of most other EU 
member states rests on perceptions of historical achievements, Federal German security 
and defense policy is based upon the rejection of the Nazi past and its militaristic 
excesses. The first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, 
developed the policy of “Westbindung,” which called for reconciliation with wartime 
enemies and integration into Western Europe. Therefore, the search for partners and allies 
 
42 Bastian Giegerich, European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's 
Security and Defence Policy (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006), 193–195; Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a 
European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 141–152. 
43 Giegerich, European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's Security and 
Defence Policy, 63–66. 
44 Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in 
the European Union, 149. 
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and the avoidance of unilateral advantage characterized the West German government’s 
external action. The NATO membership in 1955 offered the Federal Republic of 
Germany the opportunity not only to join the Western community of nations, but also to 
form a new collective defense and security identity. Consequently, as Jolyon Howorth 
has observed, NATO enabled the Federal Republic of Germany “to assert itself as a 
purely defensive, essentially civilian power in which the armed forces could only be used 
for collective defense and only in multilateral—Alliance—mode.”45  
In brief, the West German “culture of restraint” relied on reconciliation with 
former enemies, promotion of European integration and cooperative institution building, 
rejection of any interest in national military power projection, and civilian—virtually 
pacifist—sentiments within the public. However, the fundamentally changed 
international security environment after the end of the Cold War caused a transformation 
of Germany’s role in international politics. In the aftermath of reunification, the country’s 
allies called upon Berlin to accept greater responsibility in international crisis 
management efforts. Especially, the re-emergence of conflict in the Balkans produced 
enormous pressure on German security and defense policy. Faced with the dilemma of 
choosing between the rejection of war and the rejection of genocide, a redefinition of the 
pacifist and civilian-oriented “culture of restraint” was required.46 
After lengthy domestic debates, the German Federal Constitutional Court paved 
the way for the employment of German armed forces outside the country. Since 1994, 
Germany has participated in a number of international crisis management operations. As 
a result, the country has transformed its role from an “importer of security” during the 
Cold War to an “exporter of security.”  Today, Germany is the third-largest force 
provider (after the United States and the United Kingdom) in NATO-led operations 
worldwide.47 Nevertheless, the country is moving slowly towards normative acceptance 
 
45 Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 152. 
46 Giegerich, European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's Security and 
Defence Policy, 67–70; Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 152–154. 
47 Hubert Zimmermann, “Security Exporters: Germany, the United States, and Transatlantic 
Cooperation,” in The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress: US–European Relations After Iraq, ed. David M. 
Andrews (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 128–130; Christoph O. Meyer, 
The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European 
Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 68.  
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of force projection and high-risk deployments.  The cause of the slow movement resides 
in the fact that most Germans and nearly all German foreign policy élites tend to “regard 
armed conflict solely in terms of futile tragedy.”48 
France has faced less adaptation pressure because the initiation of the ESDP 
appeared as the fulfillment of an old French dream: “to project French security culture to 
a European level.”49 Since the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, France’s foreign policy 
has often been affected by its quest for great power status and national grandeur. Despite 
that, French strategic thinking has mainly focused on the protection of national 
independence, the promotion of multilateral security cooperation, and the ability to 
project forces unilaterally. The repeated military interventions in Africa have especially 
demonstrated the third theme. After the end of the Cold War, France successfully shifted 
its security culture towards more security cooperation and multilateral force projection. 
Even though the Gaullist rhetoric regarding national independence remained in place, 
policy-makers in Paris promoted the initiation and development of the ESDP as a norms-
driven, rule-based, and institutionally structured project. Accordingly, from a 
constructivist point of view, ideational inconsistencies between the ESDP and the French 
security culture seem to be minimal.50 
The United Kingdom, in contrast, faced diverging pressures. While the British 
Empire was the foremost West European power during the nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries, it lost this position due to the high costs of both world wars and the 
effects of decolonization after 1945. During the Cold War, the United Kingdom had huge 
difficulties in adapting to its international role. Even though Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill advocated a postwar British role dependent on three “circles”51 to maintain 
 
48 Donald Abenheim, Soldier and Politics Transformed: German–American Reflections on Civil 
Military Relations in a New Strategic Environment (Berlin Hartmann: Miles-Verl, 2007), 124. 
49 Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 188–189. 
50 Giegerich, European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's Security and 
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51 William Wallace, “The Collapse of British Foreign Policy,” International Affairs 81, no. 1 (Jan 
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global influence, there was little doubt among British policy-makers that London gained 
most from transatlantic special relations and least from cooperation with continental 
European neighbors. Two factors set the basis for this perception. First, the United States 
offered privileged access to nuclear and other military capabilities and promised ongoing 
close cooperation in defense and security affairs. London hence benefited more from 
these special relations than Washington did. Second, the United Kingdom remained 
skeptical regarding the process of European integration, even though the country joined 
the European Community for economic reasons in 1973. Both British policy-makers and 
the public were concerned that centralized and integrated European structures could 
undermine the country’s political freedom of action and national sovereignty.52  
Consequently, the United Kingdom faced the highest adaptation pressure in the 
area of security cooperation between EU member states and the lowest with regard to 
force projection. As the British Empire has traditionally employed armed forces as a 
means of power projection alongside civilian instruments, London has had no difficulties 
with the mix of civil and military instruments at the heart of the emerging EU security 
culture. The United Kingdom seems to be able to “Europeanize” its national security 
culture as long as these adjustments are compatible with NATO and its special 
relationship with the United States. Nevertheless, the British public remains a “reluctant 
follower” in the process of European integration.53  
The key result of constructivist analysis is that the security cultures of EU 
member states have become more similar, even though the movement towards a common 
European security culture has proceeded slowly. As Christoph Meyer has stated, the 
evidence for convergence is particularly germane concerning “the use of force for 
humanitarian purposes, the acceptance of the EU as an appropriate framework for 
security and defense policy, and the de-prioritization of the partnership with the United 
 
52 Luigi Barzini, The Europeans (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 60–61; William Wallace and 
Tim Olliver, “A Bridge Too Far: The United Kingdom and the Transatlantic Relationship,” in The Atlantic 
Alliance Under Stress: US–European Relations After Iraq, ed. David M. Andrews (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 155–156. 
53 Giegerich, European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's Security and 
Defence Policy, 84–86. 
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States.”54 Nevertheless, realist analysis challenges these constructivist findings 
concerning the emerging EU security culture. It is clear that the train is moving for the 
European Union, but it is less clear where the tracks will lead. Consequently, definite 
conclusions with regard to the long-term prospects of the EU’s security and defense 
policy cannot be drawn at this stage. 
Be that as it may, by synthesizing tentative results from both realist and 
constructivist analyses, it can be concluded that France and the United Kingdom have 
become the main drivers behind the EU’s security and defense policy. These are the two 
EU member states that spend the most on military capabilities and operations, and both 
countries have successfully transmitted their preferences to the EU level. In contrast, 
Germany, which has modified its security culture more than France and the United 
Kingdom have adjusted theirs, has been mainly an agenda-taker to date. Yet, regarding a 
number of practical security and defense issues, Germany has occupied a position in the 
middle between France, which has aimed to multiply its power by EU means, and the 
United Kingdom, which has avoided challenging NATO’s role at the heart of European 
security cooperation.55 
2. The EU’s Comprehensive Security Strategy 
The European Security Strategy (ESS) defines the key features of the EU’s 
approach to comprehensive security. The document, developed in 2003, was aimed at 
moving beyond the disputes that shaped the European agenda in the forefront of the Iraq 
War. Accordingly, the ESS represents a compromise between different security cultures 
and national interests.56 The first section deals with the changed security environment. 
While large-scale aggression against EU member states has become improbable since the 
end of the Cold War, the European Union faces “new threats which are more diverse, less 
 
54 Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in 
the European Union, 11. 
55 Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 57–60; Sven Biscop, Jolyon 
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visible and less predictable.”57 The ESS identifies, in particular, five key threats, which 
could, taken together, confront the European Union with serious challenges. These key 
threats are terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional 
conflicts, state failure, and organized crime.58 
The second section addresses the identified threats and outlines strategic 
objectives. The ESS emphasizes that “in an era of globalization … the first line of 
defense will often be abroad.”59 Distant threats such as nuclear activities in North Korea, 
state failure in West Africa, and WMD proliferation in the Middle East may be as 
pertinent as those that are near at hand. As terrorists and criminals operate worldwide, 
they can cause harm to EU member states and their citizens. These new and dynamic 
threats cannot be tackled by purely military means. Each threat requires a mix of 
complementary instruments. Furthermore, the ESS specifies two strategic objectives: (1) 
building security in the European Union’s neighborhood, and (2) creating an effective 
multilateral system that is committed to international law and the United Nations Charter.   
The third section deals with policy implications. According to the ESS, the 
European Union “needs to be more active, more coherent, and more capable” in pursuing 
its strategic objectives. This conclusion applies “to the full spectrum of instruments for 
crisis management and conflict prevention …, including political, diplomatic, military 
and civilian, trade, and development activities.” The European Union needs “to develop a 
strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.” In 
doing so, the European Union “would contribute to an effective multilateral system 
leading to a fairer, safer, and more united world.”60  
Sven Biscop argues that the five key features of the ESS are integration, 
prevention, global scope, multilateralism, and a new definition of power. (1) The EU’s 
comprehensive security strategy rests on the perception that the variety of security 
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dimensions requires a coordinated mobilization of the full spectrum of policy 
instruments. The integration of these different civil and military tools lies at the heart of 
the EU’s approach to crisis management. (2) Active prevention of conflict and instability 
aims at safeguarding and improving access to global public goods worldwide “by 
multilateral means, in the interest not only of the EU, but of all regions and States, and in 
fact of all human beings.”61 (3) In a globalized world, local tensions and armed conflicts 
can destabilize the international order. The notion of collective security therefore 
demands a global scope of action. (4) A comprehensive security strategy operates 
through dialogue, bargaining, partnership, and institutionalized, rule-based cooperation. 
Jolyon Howorth regards that as the notion of “effective multilateralism,” which aims at 
fostering global governance. In this respect, coercion is not excluded, but is seen as a 
means of last resort.62 (5) The European Union accepts that it must have the will and the 
capacity to change the course of global affairs. Comprehensiveness in this context means 
that the development of hard power is required alongside the existing EU “civilian” 
power. Nevertheless, the European Union remains different from nation states. The EU is 
a unique actor on the international stage that does not challenge powers such as the 
United States.63 
Together, these elements establish a sound basis for a holistic and normative 
approach to crisis management. The rhetoric of the ESS furthermore suggests the 
conclusion that a common security culture in the European Union is emerging.64 Sven 
Biscop therefore argues that the European Security Strategy “certainly has the potential to 
serve as an integrating conceptual framework for EU external action, to be an effective 
comprehensive strategy for external action.”65 The ESS offers, in fact, a rationale for the 
European Union to address multiple security threats in a complex environment. 
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Simultaneously, the variety of security objectives—including sustainable peace, freedom, 
democracy, human and gender rights, the rule of law, equality, social solidarity, and 
sustainable development—presents crucial analytical and practical difficulties. One major 
point in this regard is that the many kinds of security objectives hamper a clear 
understanding of what is really meant by security and what the requirements are for 
action. Hence, David Baldwin points out that, “if security is specified in terms of threats 
to all acquired values of a state, it becomes almost synonymous with national welfare or 
national interest and is virtually useless for distinguishing among policy objectives.”66 
Furthermore, the implementation of the comprehensive approach to security may 
also encounter cultural obstacles. As with the human security concept, the European 
Union claims to a greater or lesser extent universality for its aspirations, neglecting the 
fact that there are competing “visions of the good life”67 in the international system. The 
EU’s pursuit and enforcement of what it regards as “universal” normative objectives 
could provoke resistance in traditional societies. Thus, the intrinsically intended 
improvement of stability and security in crisis regions may be hampered.68 In other 
words, the simultaneous pursuit of many kinds of security could overload the EU’s 
security and defense policy in practice.  
As a result, the EU’s holistic and normative approach to security may have the 
potential to add value to international crisis management efforts, but it leaves a crucial 
question unanswered: Which actionable general conclusions can be drawn from the ESS 
with regard to the course and direction of the EU’s security and defense policy? Actually, 
the ESS on its own offers little in terms of concrete recommendations because it does not 
provide a mechanism that would define when, where, why, and how the European Union 
should act on the international stage. Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algieri therefore 
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argue that the ESS is just a “pre-strategic concept.”69 This assessment continues to be 
accurate, in light of the official report on the implementation of the ESS adopted by the 
European Council in December 2008. The report states that, “despite all that has been 
achieved, implementation of the ESS remains work in progress. For our full potential to 
be realized we need to be still more capable, more coherent and more active.”70 The 
report reaffirmed the threat assessment and strategic objectives of the ESS, but it did not 
develop a sound mechanism in order to operationalize the EU’s comprehensive approach 
to crisis management. Consequently, the European Union still needs a grand strategic 
concept that merges the full spectrum of policy instruments into the single 
methodological framework that comprehensive security demands. 
C. COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING WITHIN 
THE EU’S SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY 
1. The Changing Institutional Structure 
Even though the ESDP was created as a part of the overarching Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), it was clear from the very beginning that the introduction of 
this new field of EU policies required new institutional structures and decision-making 
procedures. This framework, which was established between 1999 and 2003, represents a 
distinctive approach to crisis management that needs to be clarified. The Lisbon Treaty, 
which entered into force on 1 December 2009, introduced the Common Security and 
Defense Policy (CSDP) as a replacement for the ESDP and changed the pillar structure 
and the institutional architecture of the CFSP. The most important changes are noted 
below. It should nonetheless be observed that the three operations examined in Chapter 
III were neither planned nor conducted under the auspices of the Lisbon Treaty. 
In the decade prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (1999–2009) the 
EU created a complex decision-making framework with regard to the EU’s security and 
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defense policy because three distinct institutional structures needed to be involved: first, 
the Council of the EU with its committee structure; second, the related Council General 
Secretariat with its administrative structure; and third, the European Commission with its 
supranational structure.71 Nevertheless, formal decision making on security and defense-
related issues is embedded in the intergovernmental structure of the EU, while the 
European Community (EC) and its supranational institutions are less involved in the 
process.  
The European Council is the highest decision-making institution in CFSP affairs, 
including ESDP and (since December 2009) CSDP. The Council is composed of the 
Heads of State and Government of the member states as well as the President of the 
European Commission, and (since December 2009) the President of the European 
Council. It defines unanimously the principles and general guidelines (e.g., common 
strategies) to be implemented in areas where the member states have interests in 
common.72 The Council is chaired by the President of the European Council, who is one 
of the top representatives of the European Union on the international stage and reports to 
the European Parliament. Until the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, the presidency rotated 
among the twenty-seven member states every six months. Since then, the European 
Council has appointed its president for a two-and-a-half year term, with the possibility of 
a single reappointment. On 19 November 2009, the European Council agreed to appoint 
Herman van Rompuy, then the Belgian Prime Minister, as its first permanent president 
under the Lisbon Treaty.73 
While the Heads of State and Government usually meet four times a year, the 
Council of the EU convenes in different configurations at the ministerial level almost 
every week. Since the launch of the ESDP in 1999, most decisions, e.g., the Joint 
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Action74 or the formal launch of an operation, have been taken by the General Affairs 
and External Relations Council (GAERC). However, the Council of the EU is an 
authoritative body of the European Union regardless of its configuration.75 For example, 
the Joint Action on Operation Artemis in Congo was adopted by the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council, and later on, the operation was formally launched by the ministers of 
agriculture.76 The Council of the EU has no formal defense configuration, but the 
ministers of defense meet informally or together with the ministers of foreign affairs four 
times a year. In contrast to other policy areas in which qualified majority voting is 
sufficient, decisions with military or defense implications require unanimity. A decision 
is blocked when one member state exercises a veto.77 
Until December 2009, the GAERC brought together the ministers of foreign 
affairs once a month. The Lisbon Treaty (Article 16 § 6 TEU) divided this council 
configuration into the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and the General Affairs Council 
(GAC). While the FAC is chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, the GAC and the other council configurations are chaired by 
the member state holding the rotating presidency. The presidency continues to rotate 
among the twenty-seven member states every six months.78 
The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is the key body that initiates and 
develops all aspects of CFSP-related issues. The PSC meets at the ambassadorial level 
twice a week as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. A European Commission 
representative participates as well, in order to ensure consistency in the EU’s external 
relations. The PSC was the “workhorse in ESDP decision-shaping”79 and remains under 
the Lisbon Treaty responsible for preparing a coherent EU response to a crisis, and it 
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exercises political control and strategic direction of EU crisis management operations. In 
addition, it monitors the international security situation and provides guidance to the EU 
Military Committee and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. The 
PSC is still chaired by the member state holding the rotating presidency. Starting in 
January 2011, a deputy of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy will chair the PSC.80   
The EU Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body set up within 
the Council of the EU. It formally comprises the EU member states’ Chiefs of Defense 
Staff (CHODS) who participate in official meetings twice a year. The EUMC usually 
meets at the level of the military representatives of the CHODS once a week. It provides 
the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military affairs within the EU. It also 
gives direction to the EU Military Staff and evaluates strategic planning documents on 
possible military operations. The Chairman of the EUMC, a former national Chief of 
Defense Staff, plays a major role within the EU’s security and defense framework. He is 
the chief military adviser to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy and attends PSC and Council meetings as necessary. In addition, he is the 
primary point of contact for the Operation Commander during EU-led military 
operations.81 
The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) works in 
parallel with the EUMC and provides advice and recommendations on civilian aspects of 
crisis management (e.g., police, the rule of law, and administration) and conflict 
prevention. Furthermore, the CIVCOM is responsible for taking measures to ensure 
consistency in the EU’s civilian crisis management. Because supranational actions (e.g., 
the European Commission’s Instrument for Stability) have the potential to overlap with 
civilian ESDP/CSDP missions, this task is of crucial importance in order to avoid friction 
and duplication.82  
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The Secretary General of the Council of the EU (SG) was “double-hatted” as the 
High Representative (HR) of the CFSP until December 2009. After Javier Solana was 
appointed the SG/HR in 1999, he became the “face and voice” of the EU’s foreign, 
security and defense policy. He assisted the Council of the EU in all matters related to the 
formulation, preparation, and implementation of CFSP, including ESDP, and acted on 
behalf of the Council of the EU in conducting political dialogue with third parties. He 
participated in both European Council and GAERC meetings.83 Due to his central role 
within the framework of CFSP and ESDP, the SG/HR possessed wide informal power, in 
particular in the agenda-setting phase.84  
The Lisbon Treaty replaced the SG/HR by a new double-hatted post. The High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy combines the 
functions of the HR of the CFSP and of the Vice-President of the European Commission 
in charge of External Relations. The new HR post includes coordination across the full 
range of EU external policies, external representation of the European Union, the 
preparation and implementation of CFSP decisions and the responsibility for the planning 
and conduct of EU-led crisis management operations. On 19 November 2009, the 
European Council agreed to appoint Lady Catherine Ashton the HR of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.85  
The Council General Secretariat (CGS) with its nearly 3,000 officials from across 
the EU supports the Council of the EU. The duties and responsibilities of the CGS are 
comprehensive. It performs traditional secretariat tasks, provides policy advice, and 
formulates compromise proposals on request. Within the CGS, the Directorate-General 
for External and Politico-Military Affairs (DG E) dealt with all aspects related to CFSP. 
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Directorate for Civilian Crisis-Management (DG E IX), and the Civilian Planning and 
Conduct Capability (CPCC), which exercised the tasks of the operation headquarters for 
civilian ESDP missions.86  
In November 2008, the French presidency proposed the creation of a Crisis 
Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), in order to conduct integrated strategic 
planning. Although the details of the organization are still unclear, the CMPD has the aim 
of bringing together all the strategic planning capabilities (DG E VIII, DG E IX, and 
parts of the Civ-Mil Cell noted below) across the CGS.87 However, these institutional 
arrangements are subject to further change within the framework of the Lisbon Treaty. A 
significant innovation will be the establishment of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) in order to assist the HR of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in 
fulfilling her mandate. The EEAS will include officials from the relevant departments of 
the CGS, the European Commission, and governments of the EU member states. The 
size, composition, and institutional position of the new service remain subject to 
negotiation. However, the EEAS will include the CMPD and the EUMS.88  
The EU Military Staff (EUMS) is composed of about 200 military experts 
seconded by member states to the CGS. It is the primary source of military expertise and 
supports the EUMC and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy in strategic planning and conduct of crisis management operations, early 
warning, and situation assessment. During the ESDP period (that is, until December 
2009) the Civil-Military Cell (Civ-Mil Cell) within the EUMS was tasked with enhancing 
civil-military coordination in the context of CFSP and ESDP. It also assisted the CPCC in 
planning and conducting civil ESDP operations. Furthermore, the EUMS and Civ-Mil 
Cell were involved in the planning of security sector reform missions that had civilian as 
well as military aspects. The Civ-Mil Cell could also set up the EU Operations Center 
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(EU OpsCen) to plan and conduct limited autonomous operations (fewer than 2,000 
troops) when no national headquarters could be identified.89  
The EU Operation Commander is responsible for planning and conducting a 
defined military operation at the military strategic level. He is appointed by the Council 
of the EU and authorized to exercise operational command or operational control over 
assigned forces. The Operation Commander is charged with development of operational 
documents, generating the military forces, and coordinating the deployment, sustainment, 
and re-deployment of the European Union forces. He is supported by the EU Operation 
Headquarters (OHQ), located outside the area of operations. Because the European 
Union does not possess a standing command structure for autonomous military 
operations, the member states provide the OHQ, as well as the EU Force Headquarters 
(FHQ) in theatre, on a case-by-case basis.90 The FHQ supports the EU Force 
Commander, who executes a military operation at the operational level under the 
authority of the Operation Commander.91  
Even though the ESDP was created as a purely intergovernmental endeavor 
involving twenty-six participating member states,92 the European Commission has been 
fully associated with the CFSP and ESDP from the very beginning. The European 
Commission has the right of policy initiative along with the member states and brings to 
the discussions its knowledge of policy areas under its responsibility (e.g., trade and 
sanctions regulations, humanitarian aid, development assistance, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction). Furthermore, the European Commission manages the CFSP budget line 
and draws up the preliminary draft budget to be submitted to the Council of the EU and 
the European Parliament every year. Even though the European Community budget 
cannot be used to directly fund EU-led military operations, the Rapid Reaction 
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Mechanism and the Instrument for Stability with its two components, long-term action 
and crisis response, provide useful support in conjunction with these operations.93 While 
the European Commission’s role in the purely military dimension of the EU’s security 
and defense policy remains limited, it has become increasingly more difficult to draw a 
clear dividing line between European Commission and CFSP responsibilities in the field 
of civilian crisis management, rule of law issues, institution building, and security sector 
reforms.94 As a result, close coordination has become of utmost importance with regard 
to the EU’s comprehensive approach to security.     
2. Procedures for EU Crisis Management 
The EU possesses a wide range of civil and military instruments for use in 
response to a crisis. They are subject to different institutional frameworks and thus to 
distinct decision-making processes.95 The EU’s crisis management procedures take into 
account the fact that close coordination of the different bodies and actors is needed in 
order to ensure a high degree of coherence. The Council General Secretariat (CGS) and 
the European Commission work together to this end. The crisis management procedures 
cover every phase of a crisis and separate the planning process into different steps 
through which civil-military coordination is continuously ensured: 
1.) When a crisis emerges, it may be considered that EU action is appropriate. An 
initial joint assessment with information from various resources sets the stage for the 
discussion in the PSC, in particular with regard to the potential availability of forces and 
the political feasibility and strategic desirability of a possible operation. The outcomes of 
this discussion initiate the development of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC). This 
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document’s grand strategic plan ensures full coherence among the different EU actors. It 
describes the desired end-state and key objectives, and proposes major strategic options 
and possible exit-strategies in response to the crisis. The first draft CMC is prepared by 
an ad hoc Crisis Response Co-ordination Team (CRCT) consisting of officials from the 
CGS (including the EUMS) and the Commission. The EUMC und CIVCOM provide 
advice and recommendations on the military and civil aspects of the document before the 
revised draft is negotiated in the PSC. Once the PSC has agreed to the final draft, the 
Council of the EU approves the CMC and tasks the elaboration of Strategic Options.96  
2.) If a military operation in response to a crisis is considered, the PSC assigns the 
elaboration of Military Strategic Options (MSO). The first draft is lead-managed by the 
EUMS and covers prioritized options, an assessment of feasibility and risks, 
recommendations regarding command and control structure, headquarters and 
commanders, and an indication of possibly available forces. At this stage, the CRCT aims 
to ensure overall planning coherence between MSO, Police Strategic Options (PSO), and 
other Civilian Strategic Options (CSO). The EUMC (CIVCOM) evaluates the MSO (PSO 
and CSO) and forwards them to the PSC together with its advice and recommendations. 
Based on this advice, the PSC evaluates the overall coherence of the proposed options 
(that is, MSO, PSO, and/or CSO) before the Council of the EU adopts the formal decision 
to take action, mostly in the form of a Joint Action. This document creates the legal basis 
of the operation and formally designates the Operation Commander, the Force  
Commander, the OHQ and FHQ, or the civilian Head of Mission (HoM). Furthermore, 
the Joint Action usually contains, among other provisions, decisions on the funding, the 
launch, and the duration of the operation.97 
3.) When the Joint Action is adopted by the Council of the EU, the PSC tasks the 
EUMC to draft the Initiating Military Directive (IMD), which provides guidance to the 
Operation Commander for the development of the necessary military strategic planning 
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documents. The overall planning coherence between civil and military aspects of the 
operation has to be ensured by joint meetings attended by civil and military planners. 
Once the PSC has approved the IMD, the Operation Commander drafts the Concept of 
Operation (CONOPS) defining the military strategic objectives, guidelines on the use of 
force, and a Statement of Forces Requirements (SOR). The EUMC provides advice and 
recommendations on these documents before the PSC endorses the revised drafts and 
submits them to the Council of the EU for formal approval. Simultaneously, the EUMC 
tasks the Operation Commander to conduct the force generation process.98  
4.) Before the launch of the operation, the Operation Commander drafts the 
Operation Plan (OPLAN) outlining the conduct of operations and defining the Rules of 
Engagement (ROE). The EUMC evaluates the document and provides advice and 
recommendations to the PSC, which submits the revised drafts to the Council of the EU 
for formal approval. Afterwards, the Council of the EU approves the OPLAN and the 
ROE, decides to launch the operation once the force generation is completed, and 
authorizes the PSC to exercise political control and strategic direction of the operation. 
The Operation Commander is then responsible for the conduct of the military operation 
and reports to the PSC and the EUMC on its progress. Finally, once the operation is 
completed, a “lessons learned” process takes place.99 
D. SUMMARY 
The chapter has argued that comprehensive security relies on a broader definition 
of security, far beyond traditional, state-centric and defense-oriented, politico-military 
approaches. The term is closely linked to various new concepts such as human security, 
global public goods, and cooperative security. Comprehensive security calls for a holistic 
and normative approach to crisis management and attempts to operationalize multiple 
dimensions of security. Thereby, the individual is the main point of reference, not the 
state.  
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The ESS offers a chance to address multiple security threats in a complex 
environment. Its key features are integration, prevention, global scope, multilateralism, 
and a new definition of power. These elements taken together can provide a sound basis 
for the EU’s approach to comprehensive security. However, the implementation of a truly 
integrated approach depends on cross-departmental and interagency cooperation at the 
national level as well as on close collaboration among the various national, international, 
and non-governmental stakeholders relevant to security issues in crisis regions. In this 
regard, the ESS does not provide the needed mechanism through which the plethora of 
civil and military tools can be integrated and synchronized into a comprehensive 
approach to crisis management.   
In short, the vague nature of the ESS derives from the divergent national security 
cultures of the EU member states. A grand strategic concept is nevertheless a 
precondition for reaching a common understanding among civil and military actors in 
order to operationalize the idea of comprehensive security and to harmonize the external 
action of the EU bodies and member state agencies relevant to the EU’s security and 
defense policy. As long as there is a lack of agreement on a sound mechanism which 
could effectively integrate and synchronize the array of policy instruments, the EU’s 
ability to implement a truly integrated comprehensive approach within its security and 
defense policy will be constrained.  
Furthermore, the complex and cumbersome decision-making process for military 
operations reflects not only the need for appropriate consultations with member states, 
but also the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management. Political-military 
activities are incorporated into an overall concept of EU crisis management that considers 
short-term military engagement along with long-term civil efforts. Nevertheless, military 
crisis management is strictly conducted according to intergovernmental procedures, while 
civilian development and peace-building efforts in the long run are embedded into the 
supranational community. Consequently, the success of the EU’s comprehensive 
approach to crisis management depends on the effective coordination of all relevant EU 
actors.  
 35
In principle, the EU crisis management procedures provide a sound basis for 
comprehensive and coherent strategic planning at all stages of the decision-making 
process for military operations. However, the respective roles of the European 
Commission and Council of the EU, the balance between civil and military aspects, and 
individual views or interests of member states and involved EU bodies pose a number of 
problems in practice. Against this background, the planning and conduct of three EU-led 
military operations at the political and strategic level are examined in Chapter III. 
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III.  COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY WITHIN EU-LED MILITARY 
OPERATIONS 
A. CASE STUDY: EUFOR RD CONGO 
1. Introduction  
The wider Great Lakes region in Africa has been affected by continuous political 
instability, civil wars, and inter-state conflicts since the early 1990s. In November 1996, 
the tensions from the war and genocide in Rwanda spilled over to its western neighbor 
country and provoked the First Congo War. President Joseph-Désiré Mobutu’s rule ended 
six months later when a rebel force supported by Uganda and Rwanda seized the capital 
city, Kinshasa. Rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila took over the office of president and 
changed the country’s name back to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), instead 
of the name Zaire, which had been introduced by Mobutu. The first military conflict was 
quickly followed by the Second Congo War when the new government of the DRC asked 
its former allies to remove their armed forces from the country. Rwanda and Uganda, 
unwilling to lose control over their neighbor country, built up new rebel movements 
which launched attacks against the fragile armed forces of the DRC in August 1998. 
Afterwards, most other neighbor countries, including Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan, and 
Zimbabwe, became involved in that war, which finally evolved into a political and 
military stalemate in 2000.100  
The assassination of President Kabila, who was succeeded by his son Joseph, led 
to a turning point in January 2001. Concerted international efforts gave rise to a ceasefire 
agreement and forced the foreign powers to leave the country. Finally, the Pretoria and 
Sun City agreements paved the way to a transition process and the formation of a new 
government including representatives of rebel movements. While the transition process 
was supported by the International Committee to Assist the Transition (ICAT), the 
implementation of the peace agreements was monitored by the UN mission in the DCR 
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(MONUC).101 The presence of MONUC was successively increased from 5,000 troops 
in 2003 to more than 17,000 in 2006, mainly deployed in the unstable eastern provinces 
of the DRC.1
The political objective of the peace agreements was to achieve a sustainable 
conflict solution as a basis for peace, stability and development. Therefore, the transition 
process in the DRC, accompanied by the ICAT, had to deal with problems such as the 
unification of the national territory, the formation of national armed forces, the 
establishment of basic security, and, last but not least, the building of strong national 
institutions. One crucial element of this process was the scheduling of democratic 
elections in the DRC in the summer of 2006. The preparation and conduct of the elections 
seemed to necessitate the reinforcement of the UN peacekeeping operation, with targeted 
support at a critical point of the transition. Against this background, in December 2005, 
the United Nations’ Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie 
Guéhenno, invited the European Union to deploy a military force in order to assist 
MONUC during the upcoming election process.103   
2. Planning and Decision Making 
The European Union had been involved in the peace process in the DRC from the 
very beginning in 1996. In this respect, the appointment of Ambassador Aldo Ajello as 
the EU Special Representative (SR) for the Great Lakes region provided a point of 
contact for the coordination of the EU’s overall engagement and ensured continuous 
political support for the projected transition. In close coordination with the Commission’s 
delegation in Kinshasa, the EU SR contributed to the international efforts and maintained 
regular contacts with key stakeholders in that country. Furthermore, the EU had launched 
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three ESDP missions in the DRC since 2003. The most visible one was Operation 
Artemis, the first autonomous EU-led military operation, conducted for four months until 
September 2003. This operation contributed in particular to the improvement of the 
security situation in Bunia, the provincial capital city of Ituri, and enabled MONUC to 
reinforce its contingents before taking over responsibility in that region.104    
In addition to the military operation known as Artemis, two civilian ESDP 
missions had been deployed to the DRC. First, Operation EUPOL Kinshasa provided 
support and advice for the training of police forces in the Congolese capital city from 
April 2005 to June 2007. The mission, which received 4.37 million euros of the CFSP 
budget, numbered approximately thirty police officers and was deployed at the request of 
the DRC’s government in close cooperation with the United Nations. Due to the 
temporary reinforcement of EUPOL for the electoral period, the budget line was 
extended with 3.5 million euros in April 2006.105 The mission’s main task consisted of 
supporting and assisting the national police forces in Kinshasa during the transition 
process.106  
Second, Operation EUSEC RD Congo, also launched in 2005, provided advice 
and assistance for security sector reform in support of the armed forces. The mission was 
composed of sixty experts based in Kinshasa and in provincial cities in the eastern part of 
the DRC. The experts were assigned to crucial positions within the armed forces in order 
to provide advice regarding command and control, budgetary and financial management, 
and training. Additionally, EUSEC conducted a project to set up a chain of payments 
system for the armed forces of the DRC. The mission received 1.6 million euros of the 
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CFSP budget from May 2005 to May 2006, as well as 1.84 million euros for the chain of 
payments project, and an extension of 4.75 million euros until June 2007.107 
Against this background, the European Union launched the planning and 
decision-making process for a possible military operation in the DRC on the basis of the 
UN request from December 2005. The United Nations clearly asked for timely limited 
and targeted support to the transition process at the crucial point of preparation and 
conduct of national elections.108 From the very beginning, EU member states and the 
European Commission appeared willing to satisfy the UN request. In particular, Belgium, 
the former colonial power, and France, which had been actively engaged in the region for 
a long period of time, strongly advocated a military intervention under the EU flag. 
However, a major problem arose. Because Great Britain, despite its general support, did 
not want to get involved in a military operation in the DRC, Germany came under 
pressure to provide essential contributions. Yet, the German government did not intend to 
deploy troops either in the DRC or in the wider region.109 As a result, the decision-
making process did not get off the ground at that time. While the Council General 
Secretariat (CGS) began to develop an option paper for a possible military operation, 
without clear political guidance, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) protracted 
the period prior to a political decision by tasking a fact-finding mission to the DRC for 
the end of January 2006.110  
Following the fact-finding mission, the CGS option paper was amended and 
initially discussed in the PSC meeting on 13 February 2006. The paper was nevertheless 
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characterized by a “lack of operational-level input [that] hampered the politico-strategic 
planning.”111 While the Operation Commander and his headquarters were not yet 
identified, the EU Military Staff was forced to act for the Operation Headquarters even 
though it did not have the expertise and means to do so. As a result, the paper proposed 
three nearly identical options for a military operation, which varied mainly regarding the 
strengths of deployed personnel (between 200 and 500) to the DRC’s capital city, 
Kinshasa. Beyond that, all options contained the common element of a rapidly deployable 
“on call” force (approximately 1,000 troops) based in Libreville, the capital city of the 
DRC’s neighbor country, Gabon. The main task of the European force (EUFOR) was to 
intervene, if necessary, in different parts of the DRC in order to secure the region during 
the electoral process.112  
The CGS option paper and the subsequent deliberations among EU member states 
made clear that a military operation was both possible and appropriate. However, the 
most urgent problem regarding planning and decision making was still unsolved. Even 
though all member states seemed willing to launch a military operation, they remained 
unwilling to offer the needed military capabilities. This problem concerned, in particular, 
the question of available headquarters. The Operation Headquarters (OHQ) at the 
strategic level and the Force Headquarters (FHQ) in the area of operations were basically 
provided by France, Germany, Italy, or the United Kingdom.113 Yet, none of these 
countries indicated an offer of headquarters. Consequently, no political decision to take 
action was made.114  
During the following weeks, the German government, in particular, came under 
increasing pressure. In comparison with the other major countries, the largest EU member 
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state appeared militarily most able to provide the OHQ at that time.115 Nevertheless, the 
new German grand coalition government (CDU/CSU-SPD) did not seek leadership in 
this operation due to domestic political reasons. Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) and 
Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier (SPD) were fully aware of the fact that the 
idea of a military intervention in Africa was unpopular with the German public.116 
Simultaneously, in Berlin, the suspicion was entertained that Paris and New York would 
arrange a deal behind the scenes that would give Germany no choice other than taking 
over the leading role.117 The decision-making process was prolonged until 14 March 
2006, when the Franco-German ministerial meeting in Berlin led to an initial political 
compromise. Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Jacques Chirac agreed that France 
and Germany would each contribute a third (some 500 troops) of the requested forces.118 
Some days later, the German government hesitantly accepted part of the leadership 
responsibility for the operation and offered its OHQ in Potsdam, while France announced 
its willingness to deploy the FHQ to Kinshasa.119 
Afterwards, the Council approved the option paper and confirmed the guidelines 
for the EU military support during the electoral process in the DRC.120 However, the 
delayed political decision to take action compressed the timeframe for further 
planning.121 The designated Operation Commander, German Lieutenant General Karl-
Heinz Viereck, was therefore tasked to develop the operational documents immediately.  
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For this reason, the EU skipped a crucial planning step and did not develop a crisis 
management concept.122 Because time was limited, the planning proceeded on the basis 
of a simple option paper.123 
Finally, on 25 April 2006, UN Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006) 
authorized the European Union to deploy forces in the DRC under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter in order to support MONUC during the electoral phase.124 Two days later, the 
Council of the EU adopted the Joint Action that formed the EU’s legal basis for 
Operation EUFOR RD Congo. According to the Council’s decision, the operation was to 
be conducted “in full agreement with the authorities of the DRC and in close coordination 
with them and MONUC.”125 The main tasks of EUFOR were (1) to provide support to 
the United Nations in the DRC in order to stabilize a situation if MONUC faced serious 
difficulties, (2) to contribute to the protection of civilians in danger under imminent threat 
of physical violence in the area of its deployment, (3) to contribute to the airport 
protection in Kinshasa, (4) to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its 
personnel and the protection of its installations, and (5) to execute operations of limited 
character in order to extract individuals in danger. The Operation Commander was to 
maintain close cooperation with the Secretary General and High Representative (SG/HR) 
for the CFSP as well as with the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
and MONUC.126 
The mission included the deployment of an advanced force element to Kinshasa, 
the availability of a battalion-size “on call” force, based out of the country in Libreville, 
 
122 Fritsch, EUFOR RD Congo: A Misunderstood Operation? 32. The Option Paper was approved by 
the Council as a substitute for the CMC. Yet, the document did not provide a grand strategic plan in order 
to ensure full coherence between all involved civil and military EU actors. 
123 Major, EU–UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: The Experience of EUFOR RD 
Congo in 2006, 17; “EU billigt Kongo-Einsatz,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, sec. Politik, 25 March  
2006. 
124 “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006), 25 April 2006,” 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm (accessed 22 November 2009).  
125 “Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP, 27 April 2006,” 
http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1096&lang=en (accessed 22 November 2009). 
126 “EU Military Operation in Support of the MONUC during the Election Process in RD Congo, 12 
June 2006,” http://consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1092&lang=en (accessed 22 November 2009). 
 44
                                                
Gabon, and a strategic reserve force “over the horizon” in Europe. The “on call” force 
was to be on stand-by, ready to be quickly deployed to the DRC upon a decision by the 
Council of the EU. Thereby, the European Union intended to ensure a deterrent capacity 
while avoiding an unnecessary heavy military presence in the DRC. The EU Force 
Commander, French Major General Christian Damay, and the FHQ were to be located in 
Kinshasa, operating in close coordination with the EU SR and the heads of mission of 
EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo and maintaining close contacts with MONUC, 
local authorities, and other international actors. Based on guidance documents, the 
Operation Commander was tasked to conduct the military strategic planning and to 
generate the requested forces in order to launch the operation no later than June 2006.127  
3. Force Generation and Mission Financing 
The number of requested troops and capabilities had been significantly increased 
during the planning process. While initial planning had presented a number of 1,500 
troops, EUFOR RD Congo finally requested 2,400 troops in the area of operations, 
including the advanced detachment (1,100 troops) in Kinshasa and the “on call” force 
(1,300 troops) in Libreville. Over and above these 2,400 troops, advanced planning 
assumed the need for a strategic reserve force “over the horizon” composed of 1,500 
additional troops.128 Against this background, the force generation task emerged as a 
huge challenge for the Operation Commander even though France and Germany had 
already indicated that each would provide some 500 troops. Despite the fact that nineteen 
EU member states and two non-EU states, Switzerland and Turkey, had promised further 
troop contributions, the list of shortfalls remained long, even after two force generation 
conferences held in Potsdam in May 2006. In particular, the provision of a strategic 
reserve force and some mission-critical capabilities (e.g., air support and medical 
evacuation assets) appeared problematic. Finally, the shortfalls were filled due to a 
Franco-German arrangement just prior to the Council’s decision to launch the operation. 
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While Germany agreed to provide some mission-critical capabilities, France offered the 
bulk of a strategic reserve force, including air support based in Chad.129 
As a result, Operation EUFOR RD Congo was launched by the Council on 12 
June 2006.130 The mission involved, as requested, 2,400 troops in the area of operation, 
contributed by twenty-one EU member states and two non-EU states (Switzerland and 
Turkey). The biggest contributors were France (1,090), followed by Germany (780), 
Poland and Spain (130 each), Belgium (60), and Sweden (55).131 In comparison with the 
force generation process, the issue of mission financing was smoothly handled by the EU 
member states. The operation drew on allocations paid by the troop contributing nations, 
according to the principle “costs lie where they fall,” while common costs were funded 
through the ATHENA mechanism.132 The latter were mainly related to the funding of 
headquarters and command, control, communications, and information (C3I) systems. 
The overall costs of the operation were approximately 100 million euros.133  
4. Conduct of Operations, Results, and Effects 
Operation EUFOR RD Congo officially began on the date of the first round of the 
presidential and parliamentary elections, 30 July 2006. The deployment of forces, which 
had already been launched some weeks before, was carried out smoothly until mid 
August when EUFOR reached its full strength. The mission’s duration was limited to the  
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four months following the first round of elections. During that time, EUFOR did not face 
serious military challenges and suffered no casualties. Nevertheless, it did employ troops 
on several occasions.134  
The most dangerous incident occurred between 20 and 22 August 2006, following 
the announcement of the results of the presidential elections’ first round. The United 
Nations requested military support from the European Union when elements of Kabila’s 
presidential guard attacked the residence of his most important rival, Vice President Jean-
Pierre Bemba, in which representatives of ICAT were also present. The EUFOR 
separated the conflicting parties in cooperation with MONUC, brought Bemba and the 
international representatives to safety, and reinforced its advanced detachment with 180 
paratroopers from the “on call” force in Gabon. Against this background, EUFOR was 
strengthened with 300 troops of the strategic reserve force before the second round of the 
presidential elections on 29 October. The second poll took place without any serious 
violent incidents. As a result, the Supreme Court of the DRC declared Joseph Kabila the 
winner with 58 percent of the votes. Kabila was inaugurated as the new president on 6 
December 2006.135   
All in all, the operation fulfilled the limited objectives of its mandate and played a 
complementary role within the concerted efforts of the United Nations and other 
organizations in the DRC. The EUFOR demonstrated its capacity to react quickly and 
used that capacity to assist MONUC in preventing the spread of violence at sensitive 
points in the electoral process. Consequently, it has been argued that the operation was a 
successful application of the “EU’s commitment to ‘effective multilateralism’ by 
strengthening MONUC, and hence the UN, in a concrete situation.”136  
However, the operation’s effectiveness must also be assessed in the context of the 
EU’s overall engagement in the DRC. In this regard, EUFOR’s role during the electoral 
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process was militarily defined, but not politically integrated into a grand strategic design 
delineating the potential lines of political, military and civil actions during the electoral 
process. Due to this omission, the military operation was not strategically interconnected 
with the civil ESDP missions and the Commission’s activities in the DRC. Consequently, 
the coherence of the EU’s actions in the field was strongly dependant on the personal 
cooperation between the EU Force Commander, the EU SR, the Commission’s 
delegation, and the heads of mission of EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo. Even 
though this personal cooperation worked well, albeit with some shortcomings, 
“coordination by objective” proved hard to achieve “in the absence of clear and 
consistent guidelines for all relevant EU actors.”137  
B. CASE STUDY: EUFOR TCHAD/RCA 
1. Introduction 
The war in Darfur has led to a human tragedy with at least 200,000 deaths and 
over 2.5 million internally displaced persons (IDP). The violence started in 2003 when 
rebel movements accused the Sudanese government of the suppression of black Africans 
in favor of Arab Africans. Since then, the conflict between different black African rebel 
groups on the one hand and the Sudanese military and Afro-Arab militias on the other has 
spread over to Chad and to the Central African Republic (CAR). Not only refugees, but 
also the rebelling black African Zaghawa, crossed the border using eastern Chad and the 
northeast of the CAR as areas of retreat. In return, the military regime in Khartoum 
supported rebel groups in Chad, where the Zaghawa minority has power over the 
remaining 97 per cent of the population. As a result of these overlapping conflicts, in 
2007 there were some 200,000 refugees from Darfur and 150,000 Chadian displaced 
persons in eastern Chad, and another 200,000 refugees from Darfur in the northeast of the 
CAR.138 
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Against this background, a joint African Union (AU)—United Nations (UN) 
hybrid operation in Darfur, called UNAMID, was organized in spring 2007.139 The new 
mission, aiming to improve the security situation in Darfur with almost 20,000 troops, 
gained Sudanese acceptance in June 2007.140 However, the UN Secretary General’s call 
for an additional mission in Darfur’s border regions was rejected by the Chadian 
President Idriss Deby. The French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, therefore 
proposed an EU-led military operation to assist a civil UN mission in eastern Chad and 
the northeast of the CAR.141  
2. Planning and Decision Making 
At French initiative, the European Commission and Council General Secretariat 
developed a joint option paper on possible EU actions in Darfur and its border regions for 
an initial discussion in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in June 2007. The 
discussion made clear, from the very beginning, that a consensus among EU member 
states was a distant prospect.142 First of all, there were concerns with regard to the 
national interests that might be involved. The former colonial power in Chad and the 
CAR, France, supported the Chadian government even though it had disagreements with 
Deby’s authoritarian regime concerning democratization and human rights. Some 1,100 
French troops was providing intelligence, logistics, and air support to the Chadian armed 
forces and keeping up the military balance at the expense of rebel groups.143  
In addition, the French proposal encountered reservations because some member 
states, in particular Germany and the United Kingdom, wanted to focus their efforts on 
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Darfur. Due to the fact that UNAMID had huge problems in generating the requested 
forces, the UN called for additional EU contributions to the hybrid operation.144 In this 
respect, the launch of an EU-led military operation in that region might have jeopardized 
the simultaneous build-up of UNAMID. Owing to these concerns, the PSC did not reach 
an agreement about rapid military action in June 2007 as had been proposed by 
France.145 
While the joint option paper was being amended and then evaluated by the EU 
Military Committee, the French Foreign Minister travelled to N’Djamena. He persuaded 
President Deby to accept the deployment of European Union forces to assist a UN 
humanitarian mission and a domestic police detachment in eastern Chad. Subsequently, 
the UN Security Council authorized, at French initiative, the development of a 
multidimensional international commitment consisting of three parts: humanitarian, 
police, and military. The United Nations took care of the first component and Chad the 
second with UN support. The mission would be conducted in eastern Chad and the 
northeast of the CAR, where refugees and other displaced people were located. The chief 
task would be to help maintain order in the refugee camps. Armed forces were to assist 
the police, but a military presence on the Chadian and CAR borders with Darfur was 
excluded.146 Based on this condition, the EU member states approved the European 
Union’s involvement in the UN mission during the meeting of the Council of the EU on 
23–24 July 2007.147 
However, one week before, Germany and the United Kingdom had signaled that 
they would not contribute with forces in theatre, but would agree to the launch of a timely 
limited operation. In contrast, France made arrangements for deploying 1,500 troops as a 
core element of a European Union force in Chad and the CAR, supplemented by 
detachments from several member states, including Austria, Finland, Italy, Spain, and 
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Sweden.148 Nevertheless, the new French government’s way of preparing the ESDP 
operation had led to irritation in some European capitals.149  
According to the crisis management concept (CMC), which was adopted by the 
Council of the EU on 12 September 2007, the possible ESDP operation was part of a 
comprehensive approach designed to enhance the EU’s commitment to handling the 
crisis in Darfur and neighboring regions.150 The three main elements comprised: a) 
increased support for AU and UN efforts to revitalize the peace process in Darfur, b) 
acceleration of the deployment of UNAMID, and c) increased funding of humanitarian 
aid and securing humanitarian access to crisis areas.151 In this context, the European 
Commission contributed ten million euros under the Instrument for Stability to finance 
UN programs designed to train, equip, and support the deployment of Chadian police 
responsible for security in refugee camps in eastern Chad. Additionally, the European 
Commission provided money for the construction of return zones for displaced persons 
under the 10th European Development Fund (EDF). The accompanying program for 
stabilization provided almost 300 million euros in Chad and 137 million euros in the 
CAR for the period 2008–2013.152   
In this framework, the EU planned a military bridging operation deployed in 
Darfur’s border regions for the duration of one year. Coordinated closely with the 
multidimensional UN presence, the strategic objective was to contribute to the 
improvement of security in the crisis triangle of Darfur, eastern Chad, and the northeast 
of the CAR. The CMC addressed the concerns regarding the possible involvement of 
French national interests by stressing the neutrality and impartiality of the European 
Union force. The mission therefore explicitly excluded border patrol and intervention in 
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combat between Chadian troops and rebel groups. The European Union force was to 
contribute to the protection of civilians in danger, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian 
aid, and ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own, UN, and associated 
personnel.153  
Based on the decision by the Council of the EU on 12 September, the Secretary 
General and High Representative, Javier Solana, reported to the UN Secretary General 
that the European Union was willing to conduct the mission’s military component for the 
first year.154 Two weeks later, the UN Security Council authorized the multidimensional 
mission in Chad and the CAR, called MINURCAT,155 for the duration of one year. The 
MINURCAT mission, comprised of 300 police officers, 50 liaison officers, and a number 
of civilian officials, was to address the humanitarian problems in the region by providing 
police stabilization and humanitarian assistance. The designated European Union military 
component was authorized to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and to use force if 
necessary.156  
On 15 October 2007, the Council of the EU adopted the Joint Action on the 
Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA, after France had offered its Operation Headquarters 
(OHQ) at Mont Valerien, the Force Headquarters (FHQ) in theatre, and the Force 
Commander, Brigadier General Jean-Philippe Ganascia. In order to give the operation a 
European Union “face,” Irish Lieutenant General Patrick Nash was appointed EU 
Operation Commander.157 He took over responsibility for the subsequent military 
strategic planning and the force generation process. 
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3. Force Generation and Mission Funding  
The reluctance of Germany, the United Kingdom, and other EU member states to 
participate in the military operation in Chad had made clear that the force generation 
process would create a huge challenge for the Operation Commander. The first informal 
force inquiries had led to the less than encouraging result of 1,500 offered troops.158 The 
evaluation of the prioritized military strategic options had to consider this less than 
auspicious prospect of support. Against this background, the European Union decided to 
design an operation with some 4,000 troops, notwithstanding the vast extension of the 
area of operations. The limited number of troops was to be balanced by the sufficient 
presence of high value capabilities such as air mobility and long-range reconnaissance.159  
Until mid October 2007, when the force generation process was to be 
accomplished, the EU member states had offered only 2,500 troops, including 1,500 from 
France. However, the French government was interested in the European Union 
appearance of the operation. France’s political target was therefore to generate at least 50 
per cent of the required forces from other member states.160 While EU and French 
officials pushed for additional contributions to EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the force generation 
process stalled for three months. Finally, the fifth force generation conference led to a 
breakthrough in mid January 2008 when France offered an additional 600 troops and 
mission-critical assets. As a result, EUFOR was comprised of 3,700 troops from fourteen 
member states, including France (2,100), Ireland (400), Poland (400), Sweden (200), 
Austria (180), and Belgium (120).161 The outcome of the force generation process was 
sobering for the EU and its member states. In particular, the French government did not 
reach its target of generating at least 50 per cent of the forces from other countries. 
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However, the operation achieved an EU “look” due to the fact that most member states 
sent personnel to the OHQ and FHQ. Germany and the United Kingdom, for example, 
were each present with four staff officers. Consequently, Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
was able to gain a multinational character.162  
The Operation Commander and other EU officials were nevertheless dissatisfied 
with the results of the force generation effort. Although most of EUFOR’s personnel 
requirements were met, significant shortfalls remained in strategic reserve forces and 
high value capabilities, in particular with regard to helicopters and medical, transport, and 
intelligence assets. Up until the fifth force generation conference, the French government 
had hoped that Germany would fill the gaps. The government in Berlin nonetheless 
remained unwilling to contribute with forces in theatre because the whole purpose of the 
operation appeared doubtful from its point of view.163   
In addition, the efforts by Germany, the United Kingdom, and other member 
states to limit the operation’s common costs to 100 million euros irritated the French. 
Due to the fact that overall costs of 400 to 500 million euros were estimated, France 
feared that it would have to pay the lion’s share of the operation’s expense. After lengthy 
negotiations in which the member states eventually agreed to grant commonly up to 120 
million euros, the French apprehension became, in fact, reality.164 The European Union, 
however, reached a position in which it was ready to launch the operation. Over and 
above the EU commitment of forces and resources, the designated participation of third 
states, in particular Russia, which promised to contribute helicopters, appeared likely to 
fill some crucial capability gaps.165  
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4. Conduct of Operations, Results, and Effects  
The Council of the EU’s decision to launch the operation on 28 January 2008,166 
hardly three months later than expected, was not only the trigger for the deployment of 
the European Union force, but also the signal for a joint rebel offensive against the 
Chadian capital city. Insurgent forces with more than 300 vehicles and 1,500 fighters 
successfully mounted a raid from the Sudanese border to N’Djamena, entered the city, 
attacked the Chadian forces, and besieged the president’s palace for 36 hours. Due to the 
deteriorating security situation, the French government reinforced its national-led forces 
in Chad, called Operation Epervier, and conducted an evacuation operation. In a few 
days, more than 800 people of 27 nationalities were brought to safety. In this situation, 
the French forces did not engage directly in combat in favor of President Deby, but 
provided logistical and intelligence support to the Chadian troops.167  
The operational role of the French forces created problems with regard to 
EUFOR. While the European Union frequently stressed the neutrality and impartiality of 
its engagement in Chad, the major troop-contributing nation (that is, France) did not 
exclude the possibility of a military intervention against the rebel coalition.168 This 
situation not only caused irritation—for example, among other participating EU member 
states and non-governmental humanitarian actors—but also presented a huge challenge 
for the EU Force Commander and his troops in theatre. The EUFOR had to draw a clear 
dividing line for Operation Epervier and prove its neutrality and impartiality.169  
Despite a colossal logistical challenge, EUFOR achieved an initial operational 
capability (IOC) on the ground with a multinational initial entry force and the French 
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maneuver battalion on 15 March 2008. Six months later, once the deployment of the Irish 
and Polish maneuver battalions had been accomplished, the Operation Commander, 
Lieutenant General Nash, declared full operating capability (FOC).170 However, 
EUFOR’s operational effectiveness was still limited due to significant shortfalls. One 
major concern of the Operation Commander was the lack of air assets. In this respect, the 
deployment of four Russian helicopters did not take place until December 2008.171  
Nevertheless, the three maneuver battalions conducted short-range patrols and 
large-scale operations in order to improve security by expanding their presence in eastern 
Chad and the northeast of the CAR. The EUFOR enabled MINURCAT to become 
operational over its entire area of responsibility. In addition, EU troops helped the 
population by providing medical consultations and deactivating unexploded ordnance. 
According to the European Union, the improvement of the security situation, along with 
the European Commission’s measures for the construction of return zones, made it 
possible for at least 10,000 people to return to their villages. In this context, the 
humanitarian assistance provided to refugees, displaced persons, and host communities 
by the European Commission added expenses of up to 30 million euros. Furthermore, 
within the framework of the strategy for cooperation with Chad, the European 
Commission continued its development assistance program by funding health support and 
water supply projects in eastern Chad with 42 million euros.172  
Despite these facts, the general security situation remained fragile. Fierce fighting 
between rebel groups and Chadian forces in the border regions continued during the 
presence of EUFOR and threatened the local population and displaced persons. The EU 
Force Commander, Brigadier General Ganascia, and his troops nonetheless credibly 
preserved EUFOR’s neutrality and impartiality during the fighting and protected refugee 
camps, MINURCAT personnel, and humanitarian workers within their means and 
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capabilities.173 Despite their efforts, 120 attacks against humanitarian organizations 
occurred and six humanitarian workers were killed in 2008. Moreover, crime and 
banditry remained a serious threat in the border regions.174 
From the time the operation was launched, it was clear that an international 
follow-on force should take over the mission twelve months after the declaration of its 
IOC. After tedious negotiations, in October 2008, President Deby accepted the build-up 
of a MINURCAT military component with up to 5,200 soldiers.175 Afterwards, a number 
of troop-contributing nations decided to remain on the ground with MINURCAT. Besides 
that, the EU agreed to hand over campsites and equipment to the follow-on force. 
Additionally, the European Community (EC) was willing to continue its long-term 
assistance to Chad and the CAR. In order to establish enduring stability in the region, the 
European Commission undertook action to promote the rule of law, economic recovery, 
good governance, and reform of the justice and security sectors, with the aim to sustain 
assistance at least until 2013. Finally, the European Union declared it would continue its 
political and humanitarian efforts in Darfur.176 
On 15 March 2009, EUFOR Tchad/RCA accomplished its bridging mission when 
a military ceremony in Abeche, Chad, marked the handover of authority to MINURCAT. 
Around 2,000 EU troops were “rehatted” and continued to serve in the region under the 
UN flag.177  
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C. CASE STUDY: EUNAVFOR SOMALIA 
1. Introduction 
In 2008, piracy off the Horn of Africa became a major global concern. While it 
had been a local problem in Somali territorial waters for at least ten years, the number of 
pirate attacks doubled from 2007 to 2008 and switched from the shoreline into the high 
seas off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. The upsurge in piracy posed a rising threat to 
commercial fishing and merchant shipping and necessitated the protection of 
humanitarian aid designated for the Somali population, and the displacement of sea 
traffic further away into international waters. The high level of piracy forced, for 
example, the World Food Program (WFP) to temporarily suspend food deliveries to the 
port of Mogadishu until different nations agreed to provide timely limited naval 
escorts.178 Overall, 111 piracy incidents in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast 
were reported in 2008 according to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). Of those 
attacks, 46 resulted in the seizure of commercial vessels by pirates.179  
The Somali piracy evolved into a serious threat due to several interrelated factors. 
First, the continued absence of a reliable and functioning government in Mogadishu 
meant that Somalia was incapable of taking action against piracy and armed robbery at 
sea. The country’s internal unrest and the power of local warlords and clan leaders 
created a favorable situation for organized crime. The critical maritime route through the 
Gulf of Aden connecting the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean represented a potentially 
lucrative target in this context. Additionally, the collapse of state authorities opened the 
coast of Somalia to uncontrolled foreign exploitation. Large commercial fishing vessels 
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from distant nations gained access to traditional domestic fishing areas and destroyed by 
degrees the regular livelihood of coastal village communities. The first incidents of 
piracy occurred when Somali fishermen began to board foreign vessels and accuse their 
crews of fishing illegally. While piracy initially involved “taxing” maritime traffic, 
especially fishing vessels, it subsequently led to hijacking of merchant ships and 
kidnapping their crews. Furthermore, new means became available to pirate groups that 
simultaneously evolved into full-fledged criminal ventures. In particular, the use of 
“mother ships” represented a major tactical and logistic innovation. Instead of using 
skiffs whose operating range was limited to the coastal waters, pirate groups began to 
employ “mother ships.” These ships transported skiffs to the high seas where big catches 
such as oil tankers and container ships became new prey for pirates. As a result, piracy 
off the Horn of Africa appeared on the international security agenda.180 
The UN Security Council expressed its concerns on the deteriorating security 
situation off the Somali coast with the adoption of three resolutions on the subject within 
four months in 2008. The UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1801 and 1814, 
adopted on 20 February and 15 May 2008, only mentioned piracy among other threats in 
calling for a comprehensive approach to address the situation in Somalia.181 In contrast, 
UNSCR 1816, adopted with the consent of the transitional government of Somalia (TGS) 
on 2 June 2008, dealt particularly with the issue of piracy and armed robbery. Due to the 
lack of security capacity of the TGS, the resolution authorized foreign war ships to “enter 
the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed 
robbery” for an initial period of six months. The resolution also recommended 
cooperation between the involved states “in determining jurisdiction and the investigation 
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and prosecution of persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery.”182 In brief, 
UNSCR 1816 paved the way for new international efforts in fighting piracy off Somalia 
due to the absence of a near-term regional solution.183  
2. Planning and Decision Making 
Among the EU member states, there was a common perception that piracy and 
armed robbery off the Horn of Africa needed to be addressed. In response to the 
deteriorating security situation, the Council of the EU in June 2008 asked the Council 
General Secretariat (CGS) and the European Commission to study possible options in 
order to contribute to the implementation of UNSCR 1816. However, opinion was 
divided between those member states that preferred the launch of a full-fledged EU-led 
maritime operation and those that advocated a simple coordination mission that left 
military assets under national authority.184  
In particular, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, holder of the rotating EU 
presidency between July and December 2008, argued for an anti-piracy operation under 
the flag of the European Union. France had been one of the main drivers behind the 
adoption of UNSCR 1816 advocating the establishment of an international anti-piracy 
force off the Horn of Africa. It had responded rapidly and robustly to the Somali piracy 
challenge whenever French interests were involved. Besides that, France pushed for an 
EU-led maritime operation, aiming at strengthening and enhancing the ESDP with a true 
naval dimension. The operation would include the deployment of naval and air assets off 
the coast of Somalia with an EU command and control structure and would allow the 
European Union to gain experience in a new domain of crisis management operations.185 
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France was supported by member states with considerable merchant or fishing fleets such 
as Greece and Spain, which also faced domestic pressure to protect their maritime 
interests off the Horn of Africa. Due to the importance of the economic and security 
interests at hand, an EU-led maritime operation represented a bargain to demonstrate the 
capacity to act of the European Union and its member states.186  
On the other hand, the United Kingdom preferred the initiation of an EU 
coordination mission, comprised of small staff elements in Brussels and the crisis region. 
While the mission was to coordinate force generation, information, and escort 
organization, military assets would remain under national authority. The British 
government was reluctant to endorse the launch of an EU-led maritime operation because 
it wanted to avoid challenging the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) as the only existing Euro-Atlantic organization competent in naval 
operations.187 Moreover, the United Kingdom and—to some degree—the Netherlands 
believed that NATO would be more effective for anti-piracy action. In fact, at the same 
time as the European Union, NATO prepared the deployment of warships off the Horn of 
Africa at the request of the United Nations. The operation, named Allied Provider, aimed 
at providing temporary protection for WFP assistance shipments in the region. On 24 
October 2008, NATO deployed five warships from Germany, Greece, Italy, Turkey, and 
the United Kingdom to provide close protection of WFP vessels and to patrol shipping 
routes off the Somali coast.188 
In contrast to the countries listed above, Germany did not commit itself to one 
option at an early stage. An EU-led maritime operation off the Somali coast presented no 
obvious advantages at first glance. The German Navy was already participating in the 
US-led anti-terrorism operation Enduring Freedom near the Horn of Africa and NATO’s 
naval operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea. NATO was competent, 
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flexible, and entirely capable of undertaking anti-piracy action. Yet, the attentive public 
in Germany—as that in other EU member states—increasingly criticized these two 
operations as a means to please the United States rather than to serve the European 
Union’s security interests. Policy-makers in Berlin therefore feared that the launch of 
another NATO-led operation at sea could lead to unnecessary controversial domestic 
debates.189  
Furthermore, the German government faced huge legal problems that needed to 
be addressed prior to the planning of any anti-piracy operation, whether conducted by the 
European Union or NATO. Due to constitutional constraints, the German Navy was—in 
contrast to many other navies—not generally authorized to combat piracy on the high 
seas. Therefore, a sound legal framework for the use of military force against acts of 
piracy and armed robbery was required in addition to the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) and UNSCR 1816. After detailed debates in Berlin, Germany’s grand 
coalition government eventually agreed upon the required legal conditions and decided to 
support the initiation of an EU-led anti-piracy operation.190  
Afterwards, the United Kingdom smoothly began to adjust its position. Although 
London would have still preferred a NATO operation, in British eyes, it would be 
disadvantageous to be the “odd one out” when France, Germany, Spain, and other EU 
member states engineered an arrangement. Due to the United Kingdom’s rank as a major 
naval power, British credibility on the high seas demanded participation. Accordingly, 
London switched tactics to argue for both an EU coordination mission with immediate 
effect and, subsequently, an EU-led maritime operation. This British turn paved the way 
for a general agreement among the EU member states. Moreover, it made it possible for 
the United Kingdom to take a leading role in the planning and conduct of the first 
maritime operation under the aegis of the European Union.191   
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At its meeting on 15 September 2008, the Council of the EU agreed upon its 
approach to address piracy off the Horn of Africa. It decided to promptly establish an EU 
Naval Coordination Cell (EU NAVCO) in Brussels with the task “of supporting the 
surveillance and protection activities carried out by some member states off the Somali 
coast.”192 Furthermore, the Council of the EU agreed to press forward with the planning 
work on a maritime operation. The EU NAVCO was to establish a connection with the 
United Nations, World Food Program, humanitarian agencies, and maritime 
organizations in order to facilitate coordinated support by EU member states. It was 
additionally to liaise with relevant military actors in the Horn of Africa region such as 
NATO and the US-led Coalition Task Forces (CTF 150—Operation Enduring Freedom, 
and CTF 151—Counter-Piracy off Somalia). Finally, it was to be prepared to hand over 
its coordination tasks seamlessly to an EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) once the 
European Union launched the subsequent operation. The EU NAVCO resumed work 
under the leadership of the Spanish Navy Captain Andrés A. Breijo Claúr before the end 
of September 2008.193 
Operation EUNAVFOR Somalia was planned to serve as a part of the EU’s 
comprehensive approach to the Somali crisis embedded in the “Joint Strategy Paper” for 
the country for the period 2008–2013. Somalia was considered “a test case for the 
stabilization of the broader Horn of Africa region.”194 The EU’s overall objective was to 
help establish a peaceful and secure environment in Somalia and to reduce poverty by 
providing humanitarian aid and increasing economic activity. The “Somalia Joint 
Strategy Paper” made available 215.8 million euros under the 10th European 
Development Fund (EDF). In this context, the European Union supported the Djibouti 
process for peace and reconciliation and the African Union’s mission to Somalia 
(AMISOM). Under its Instrument of Stability, the European Commission assisted the 
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establishment of basic operational capacities for the transitional state institutions in 
Somalia. Simultaneously, the European Union and some of its member states supported 
the African Union (AU) in terms of financing, planning, and capacity building for 
AMISOM. These commitments made the European Union the single largest donor to 
Somalia.195 
However, the efforts by the European Union and other international actors could 
only aim at helping solve the underlying problems of Somalia’s instability in the long 
run. This fact had a huge impact on the planning work for Operation EUNAVFOR 
Somalia. It was clear that any sustainable solution for the piracy threat in the Horn of 
Africa region required addressing lawlessness in Somalia. In the absence of a short-term 
regional solution ashore, the deployment of naval assets could, hence, only address the 
consequences, but not the roots of the piracy problem.196 Under the given circumstances, 
the Council of the EU limited the political-military objective for the EU’s anti-piracy 
operation. The deployment of naval assets under the EU flag aimed at helping improve 
the maritime security in the region by deterring, preventing, and repressing acts of piracy 
and armed robbery off the Somali coast for an initial period of one year. The 
EUNAVFOR was to provide escort to vessels of the WFP delivering food aid to Somalia, 
protect vulnerable shipping in the Gulf of Aden, establish surveillance in pirate operating 
zones, and liaise with all relevant actors in the region. It was authorized to “take the 
necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent, and intervene in order to 
bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery.”197  
A credible deterrence posture demanded, inter alia, the capacities to board and 
seize pirate vessels, detain and transfer suspects, and prosecute pirates and armed 
robbers. A key complicating issue was the fact that these competencies fell into the 
domain of the EU member states. The legally compliant provision of these capacities 
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needed to be ensured prior to the launch of any forceful anti-piracy action. Even though 
this was to be an EU-led maritime operation, domestic legislation played a major role in 
the planning work at the political and strategic levels. Legal uncertainties concerned 
particularly the “hot pursuit” of suspects into Somali territorial waters and the 
prosecution of pirates and armed robbers by EU member states and third states.198 The 
first problem was solved in November 2008 by reaching an agreement with the TGS that 
authorized EU-led naval forces not only to enter Somali territorial waters, but also to 
detain and transfer suspects.199 The second problem was addressed by two different 
approaches. First, the flag state of naval forces that detained suspects could attempt to 
prosecute these individuals by domestic courts. The flag state, however, faced the risks 
that domestic courts could decline jurisdiction over the matter and that suspects could 
seek asylum under international humanitarian law once in the country. This approach was 
thus both practically and legally problematic and, furthermore, not applicable to all EU 
member states due to the absence of the required national legislation.200  
As a result, the European Union and other international actors pursued the 
implementation of a second, less problematic solution: the prosecution of pirates by 
countries in the neighborhood of Somalia. As Kenya was the closest country with the 
required competence and legislation, the Council General Secretariat, adopting a policy 
similar to that of the United Kingdom and the United States, pressed ahead on 
negotiations with the government in Nairobi. In November 2008, the United Nations 
supplemented these efforts and sponsored an international working group meeting in 
Nairobi to consider new legal and political approaches to combat piracy. The working 
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group identified, inter alia, a lasting need for coordinated international anti-piracy action 
and permanent arrangements ensuring the prosecution of pirates and armed robbers by 
third states in the Horn of Africa region. The UNSCR 1851, adopted on 16 December 
2008, embraced these recommendations and facilitated the ratification of a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) between the Council of the EU and the government of Kenya in 
March 2009.201 The European Commission contributed decisively to the conclusion of 
the MOU by providing financial and logistical support to the prosecution department of 
the Kenyan government. It included, additionally, financial support to the security of 
maritime routes in its indicative program for 2009–2011.202  
3. Force Generation and Mission Financing 
While the international and intergovernmental negotiations over the legal issues 
were being conducted, the Council General Secretariat and the EU member states looked 
for an EU Operation Headquarters. After its agreement to the initiation of an EU-led 
maritime operation off the Somali coast, the United Kingdom became increasingly 
interested in a leading role in the European efforts to tackle piracy. Naval operations were 
not only a longstanding area of British competence and tradition; the command over this 
operation promised also high international visibility with low costs. However, both 
policy-makers and the public in the United Kingdom remained generally hesitant 
regarding the EU’s military aspirations. It therefore proved to be a difficult decision for 
the government in London to offer its Operation Headquarters in Northwood. The United 
Kingdom’s most important allies, France, Germany, and the United States, preferred 
Northwood for different reasons. After the activation of the Operation Headquarters in 
Potsdam and Mont Valerien for the two most recent EU-led military operations, France 
and Germany considered that the United Kingdom had waited for its turn long enough.203 
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Additionally, Berlin and Paris welcomed the fact that the British leading role would 
represent a milestone in the development of the ESDP. The United States was not averse 
because the activation of Northwood would ensure close coordination and information 
exchange between EUNAVFOR and the US-led CTF 150 and 151 off the Horn of Africa. 
Against this background, the government in London decided to offer the Operation 
Headquarters in Northwood in October 2008.204 
On 10 November 2008, the Council of the EU appointed Royal Navy Rear 
Admiral Phillip Jones as EU Operation Commander and designated the EU Operation 
Headquarters in Northwood. Rear Admiral Jones took over responsibility for the 
subsequent military strategic planning and the force generation process. The operation 
required at least the deployment of three warships, including helicopters and embarked 
security detachments, three maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (MPRA), an 
auxiliary vessel, and an EU Force Headquarters (FHQ). As the operation was to focus on 
piracy rather than the full range of threats normally associated with naval operations, it 
was decided that the Force Commander could assume the responsibilities of the Task 
Group Commander as well and conduct the operation afloat, supported by a small 
headquarters. After offers for the EU Force Commander post from three EU member 
states, the Political and Security Committee agreed to appoint first Greek Commodore 
Antonios Papaioannou, to be followed by Spanish and Dutch Force Commanders, each 
for a period of four months.205 
Due to the small size of the required headquarters, the joint funding of the 
operation did not raise political controversies among the EU member states. According to 
the ATHENA mechanism, the common budget was to cover mainly the running costs of 
the EU OHQ and FHQ, while the costs for supplying the forces were shared by the troop 
contributing countries according to the rule “costs lie where they fall.” Because these 
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nationally borne costs represented the bulk of the operation’s expenditures, the joint 
funding managed under the authority of the ATHENA special committee amounted to 8.3 
million euros for the first year.206   
Initial indications suggested that the EU member states were willing to provide 
most of the requested capabilities, including at least four warships. There was, 
nevertheless, a significant gap of two MPRA that could not be filled prior to the launch of 
the operation on 8 December 2008.207 Initially, EUNAVFOR was composed of a Spanish 
MPRA and four frigates from France, Germany, Greece, and the United Kingdom. Due 
to additional contributions, the force strength increased in the next months. As a result, 
EUNAVFOR was composed of seven frigates (two from France, two from Germany, and 
one each from Greece, Italy, and Spain), three MPRA (one each from France, Germany, 
and Spain), four corvettes (three from Sweden, and one from France), and two auxiliary 
vessels (one each from Germany and Spain) in July 2009.208 
4. Conduct of Operations, Results, and Effects 
The UNSCR 1846 of 2 December 2008, which extended the mandate to combat 
piracy off the Horn of Africa for another twelve months, set the stage for the launch of 
Operation EUNAVFOR Somalia on 8 December 2008.209 Five days later, the Operation 
Commander declared initial operational capability when the Greek flagship HS Psara 
entered the area of operations and took command over the assigned naval forces. 
Afterwards, NATO finished Operation Allied Provider and handed over WFP protection 
responsibilities to EUNAVFOR. Royal Navy frigate HMS Northumberland completed 
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the first EU naval mission on 18 December 2008. It safely escorted the WFP ship MV 
Semlow delivering humanitarian aid from Mombassa to the Somali port of Mogadishu.210   
On 25 December 2008, EUNAVFOR engaged pirates for the first time when the 
German frigate FGS Karlsruhe assisted an Egyptian merchant ship in fighting off a pirate 
attack in the Gulf of Aden. The frigate’s helicopter was launched after an emergency call 
from the Egyptian vessel and fired warning shots to deter the attack. The engagement was 
successfully completed when a German boarding team detained the pirates. However, the 
German frigate was subsequently directed to release the pirates after their weapons and 
equipment had been seized.211 This fact highlighted the urgent need to find a legally 
compliant solution for the prosecution problem. The European Union thus pressed ahead 
with its negotiations with Kenya and entered into an agreement on 6 March 2009.212 
During the first year of the operation, EUNAVFOR successfully conducted its 
priority mission to protect WFP shipping off the Somali coast. It provided 54 escorts to 
WFP ships and ensured that more than 296,000 tons of food were delivered to the port of 
Mogadishu.213 Additionally, EUNAVFOR contributed to the protection of vulnerable 
shipping in the Gulf of Aden region and assisted the African Union by escorting 
AMISOM shipments to Somalia. Due to the linkage between operational anti-piracy 
efforts and the judicial follow-up, EUNAVFOR became one of the more potent and 
effective military forces conducting anti-piracy action off the Horn of Africa. In a number 
of incidents, EU naval units intercepted pirate attacks, detained individuals, and seized  
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armaments and equipment. In this context, the government in Nairobi accepted 52 men 
accused of piracy that had been detained by EU-led forces to face prosecution in 
Kenya.214 
Furthermore, EUNAVFOR contributed to the establishment of the Internationally 
Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden. International military assets 
were deployed within the area in order to improve maritime security and provide 
protection and support to commercial shipping. More effective communication with the 
commercial shipping community was achieved through the creation of a web-based 
interface, named Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), at the Operation 
Headquarters Northwood.215 This widely recognized interface represented an important 
innovation in the conduct of maritime security and promoted registration, information 
exchange, and guidance. Finally, the Operation Headquarters established an international 
cooperation framework with NATO, the US-led CTF 151, other navies operating off the 
Somali coast, and the countries in the Horn of Africa region.216  
Nevertheless, the establishment of an international naval presence off the Horn of 
Africa could not prevent the explosion of pirate attacks. The number of incidents in the 
Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast increased from 111 in 2008 to 196 in 2009. Even 
in the IRTC, some merchant ships were attacked. Overall, 47 vessels were hijacked in 
2009 (compared to 46 in 2008) and 867 crewmembers were kidnapped by pirates. 
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Moreover, ten merchant seamen were injured and five were killed.217 Additionally, the 
prosecution agreement with Kenya raised difficulties. Despite financial and logistical 
support from the European Union, the country’s legal framework remained inefficient. 
By the end of 2009, only a small number of those detained and charged with piracy had 
been fully processed through the Kenyan judicial system. It is important to note that the 
Kenyan government withdrew from the agreements with the European Union and the 
United States in April 2010.218 
However, the European Union, other international actors, and the TGS began to 
address the root causes of piracy in Somalia. Coastal communities received access to 
socioeconomic support in order to protect local fishing areas, cooperative businesses, and 
small-scale industries. Somalia’s transitional state authorities, the self-declared Republic 
of Somaliland, and the new administration of Puntland initiated new efforts in capacity 
building to address lawlessness. International actors supported the capacity building, for 
example, by funding the establishment of a Somali Coast Guard.219 As a result, a 
comprehensive approach to maritime security began to work in the Horn of Africa region. 
Whether these efforts will succeed remains to be seen.   
D. COMPARISON: EU-LED MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE EU’S 
APPROACH TO COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY 
The case studies have provided evidence that the planning and decision-making 
process of the operations examined reflect not only the need for appropriate consultations 
with the twenty-six EU member states participating in the ESDP, but also the EU’s 
understanding in policy, strategy, and operations of comprehensive security. Most EU 
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member states do not have ambitions for the European Union to evolve into a “hard 
power” actor comparable to the United States of America. The EU’s aim is to become a 
security actor able to contribute to international crisis management efforts by exercising a 
wide range of civil and military instruments.  
In Operation EUFOR RD Congo (July–December 2006), the short-term military 
engagement supplemented a number of long-term civil efforts in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) at a sensitive point in the country’s political transition process. 
Additionally, the mission was planned and executed in support of a clear political 
objective. By supporting MONUC in the summer of 2006, EUFOR facilitated the 
conduct of the first free and relatively fair elections in that country in over forty years. 
Because its limited mandate was accomplished, the operation can be regarded as a 
political success. Nevertheless, the planning and decision making, as well as the force-
generation process, disclosed serious weaknesses, flaws, and obstacles.  
First, the discord among the EU member states regarding the question of burden 
sharing led to a number of difficulties. Although member states and the European 
Commission quickly reached a general consensus that a military operation was 
appropriate, some major countries concurrently remained reluctant to provide the 
necessary military contributions. The European Union therefore needed nearly three 
months in order to identify headquarters and major troop contributors for the operation. 
As a result, Operation EUFOR RD Congo was certainly not an example of rapid reaction.  
Second, the deliberations in Brussels did not focus on the question of how the 
operation could be incorporated into the EU’s comprehensive approach to the DRC. Due 
to the protracted political decision making, the real time for strategic planning, force 
generation, and deployment was exceptionally compressed. However, the Council 
General Secretariat and the European Commission did not use the opportunity to prepare 
a grand strategic plan ensuring full coherence between the short-term military operation 
and the long-term civil activities in the country. Because the European Union did not 
produce a separate crisis management concept, the military strategic planning for the 
operation had to proceed on the basis of a simple option paper. This lack of effective 
coordination hampered the development of a truly integrated approach.  
 72
Although the Operation Headquarters quickly completed the subsequent military 
strategic planning, the operational documents were unable to substitute for the missing 
strategic plan. Without clear political guidance, the Operation Commander was unable to 
develop sustainable modalities of cooperation between EUFOR and other EU actors and 
missions in the country. Such cooperation, therefore, had to be established in country on 
an ad hoc and personal basis. Against this background, Operation EUFOR RD Congo 
may be assessed as a limited political success, but not as a role model for the EU’s 
comprehensive approach to security in future military operations. 
In contrast, Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA (March 2008 – March 2009) was 
incorporated into an overall concept of EU crisis management that considered short-term 
military engagement along with long-term civil efforts. The success of this 
comprehensive approach to crisis management depended basically on two essential 
elements: effective coordination of all relevant EU actors and the willingness of the 
member states to participate in a joint action as required. The comprehensive planning of 
ESDP-relevant EU bodies worked comparatively well at all stages of the political and 
strategic decision-making process. The European Union was actually able to incorporate 
civil and military contributions into its crisis management planning. The European 
Commission, for example, was willing to bring in its already existing medium and long-
term programs. However, the planning suffered a priori from a fundamental problem. 
While some member states, in particular France, advocated a military operation in central 
Africa, there was an ongoing discussion about the grand strategy and the question of how 
the EU might address, if at all, the deteriorating situation in the crisis triangle of Darfur, 
Chad, and the CAR.  
Despite this fact, the European Union concluded that military action in Chad and 
the CAR was appropriate. Accordingly, the subsequent planning for Operation EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA was accomplished without a grand strategic design for the triangle of crises. 
Although the military operation was expected to contribute to the EU’s engagement in 
tackling the crisis in Darfur, the main aim was actually limited to preventing the spread of 
the Darfur crisis into the western border regions. Consequently, the crisis management 
concept was suitable for addressing some of the effects rather than the causes of the 
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overall crisis. Against this background, it was not surprising that several EU member 
states, including Germany and the United Kingdom, remained reluctant to contribute 
significant forces to this operation. The required capabilities were probably available in 
some member states, but the political will to employ them in this case plainly was not. As 
a result, Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA suffered more from the lack of common 
understanding of means and ends among the EU member states than from a lack of 
comprehensive planning within the European Union.  
Operation EUNAVFOR Somalia (launched in December 2008) represents an 
important step forward in comparison with the operations noted above. First, the British 
move towards EU-led anti-piracy action was essential for an efficient agreement among 
the EU member states. It paved the way for the first maritime operation under the aegis of 
the European Union. The operation was then planned and conducted as a part of the EU’s 
comprehensive approach to the ongoing Somali crisis. The short-term naval deployment 
was designed to supplement a number of long-term civil efforts intended to address 
piracy and lawlessness. The operation was successfully embedded into the EU’s joint 
strategy for Somalia. This commitment could only aspire to helping solve the underlying 
problems of Somalia’s instability in the long run. In the absence of a short-term (and 
enduring) regional solution ashore, the deployment of naval assets was necessary to 
tackle the consequences, but not the roots of the piracy problem. The political-military 
objective of the operation was therefore clearly limited to helping suppress piracy and 
armed robbery off the Somali coast for an initial period of one year.   
In order to accomplish its mission, EUNAVFOR Somalia demanded a credible 
deterrence capacity relying on effective law enforcement to ensure the prosecution of 
those accused of piracy and armed robbery. Despite a broad range of legal and civil-
military uncertainties, the European Union implemented a new approach to combat 
piracy involving EU member states and third states in the Horn of Africa region. It 
succeeded in overcoming most of the legal difficulties through the combined efforts of 
EU member states, the Council General Secretariat, and the European Commission. The 
European Commission, for example, contributed decisively to the conclusion of the 
prosecution agreement with Kenya that helped to ensure a close linkage between 
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operational anti-piracy efforts at sea and the judicial follow-up ashore. The EUNAVFOR 
therefore became one of the more potent and effective military forces off the Horn of 
Africa. It successfully protected the World Food Program and AMISOM220 shipments to 
Somalia, deterred pirate attacks, detained a number of suspects and brought them to 
court. 
With Operation EUNAVFOR Somalia, the European Union developed and 
implemented a more integrated approach to comprehensive security in the face of a threat 
to EU and worldwide interests. The operation demonstrated that the CSDP can become 
an instrument that serves the interests of the European Union and its member states both 
directly by protecting their maritime trade and indirectly by stabilizing crisis regions in 
the wider European neighborhood. One can therefore argue that a “culture of 
coordination” as envisaged in the EU crisis management procedures and subsequent 
planning concepts is developing.221 However, the greatest internal challenge ahead 
remains the effective coordination of all the civil and military instruments at hand, 
enabling crisis management to be planned and conducted in an integrated fashion from 
beginning to end. Chapter IV provides an analysis of decisive factors for the 
improvement of a comprehensive approach to security in future EU-led military 
operations. 
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
The quest for comprehensive security has characterized the European Security 
and Defense Policy (ESDP) since its launch in 1999. The concept of comprehensive 
security relies on a broader definition of security, one that is far more extensive than 
traditional, state-centric and defense-oriented political-military approaches. It calls for a 
holistic and normative approach to crisis management, and it attempts to operationalize 
multiple dimensions of security. The main idea is the activation and integration of all 
instruments at hand—diplomatic, military, financial, judicial, police, customs, 
reconstruction and development—in order to address the root causes of conflicts. In this 
context, military forces are to establish and ensure a safe and secure environment in 
which civil instruments can unfold their full potential to solve the underlying problems of 
international crises or internal instability. The sustainable improvement of stability and 
security in crisis regions depends, in turn, on cross-departmental and interagency 
cooperation at the member state level and on close collaboration among all relevant 
actors at the EU level.  
Although the European Security Strategy (ESS) offers a rationale to address 
multiple security threats in a complex environment, the variety of security objectives 
presents crucial analytical and practical difficulties. For example, the many “kinds of 
security” hamper a clear understanding of what is really meant by “security” and what the 
requirements are for action. The ESS offers little in terms of concrete recommendations 
with regard to the course and direction of the EU’s security and defense policy. 
Furthermore, the ESS and subsequent documents do not provide a sound mechanism that 
merges the full spectrum of policy instruments into the single methodological framework 
that comprehensive security demands. At first glance, this fact appears surprising because 
the mix of civil and military instruments is at the heart of the EU’s security and defense 
policy. The vague nature of the ESS derives, though, from the divergent national security 
cultures of the EU member states. Moreover, the absence of clearly defined criteria 
leaves the member states and EU bodies room for flexible maneuvers in order to pursue 
national or group interests at the EU level. 
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Nevertheless, the European Union has made significant progress with regard to 
the implementation of the comprehensive approach to security in comparison with the 
uncoordinated state of affairs in the 1990s. In 2006, Operation EUFOR RD Congo and 
the multiple civil EU activities in that country were coordinated on an ad hoc and 
personal day-to-day basis between the relevant EU actors on the ground (e.g., the EU 
Special Representative, the EU Force Commander, the Heads of Mission of EUPOL 
Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo, and the Head of the Commission’s Delegation in 
Kinshasa). For Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the European Commission was involved 
in the planning process from the beginning in July 2007. The Commission was willing to 
bring in its already existing programs for Chad and the CAR and supported the funding 
of the UN police training program in Chad and the construction of return zones for 
displaced persons. Despite that, both the Council of the EU and the European 
Commission did not implement a truly integrated approach in order to address the 
underlying causes of the crises in Darfur, Chad and the CAR. Finally, Operation 
EUNAVFOR Somalia was framed as a part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to the 
Somali crisis in 2008. The naval anti-piracy action was planned along with long-term 
civil efforts to address lawlessness in the Horn of Africa region. More effective 
coordination between EU member states, the Council General Secretariat, and the 
European Commission made it possible, for example, to deal with the problem of 
bringing piracy suspects to justice. With Operation EUNAVFOR Somalia, the European 
Union developed and implemented a more integrated approach to crisis management. 
However, the gradual development towards a more integrated approach cannot hide the 
fact that significant flaws and weaknesses hampered the implementation of the EU’s 
comprehensive security strategy in the three military operations examined. Three distinct 
aspects are relevant.  
First, the implementation of a truly integrated approach demanded cross-
departmental and interagency cooperation at the national level as well as close 
collaboration among the relevant bodies at the EU level. In this regard, the Council 
General Secretariat, the European Commission, EU member states, and the Operation 
Headquarters needed too much time for solving operational problems at the strategic 
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level—for example, the legal uncertainties related to the judicial follow-up of the EU’s 
anti-piracy efforts. Even though the European Union has become more efficient in 
bringing together the different instruments it has at its disposal, the civil-military 
interface remains an important problem. EUNAVFOR Somalia, like the other two 
operations examined, suffered from the absence of a sound coordination mechanism. 
Therefore, the European Union needs to develop a comprehensive security concept 
through which the plethora of civil and military tools could be seamlessly synchronized 
into a truly integrated and coherent approach to crisis management. This concept has to 
define clear terms, mechanisms, procedures, and responsibilities for the coordination of 
actors and instruments at different levels of action (political-strategic, military-strategic, 
operational, and tactical). 
Second, the institutional architecture of the EU’s security and defense policy and 
the competitive roles of the relevant EU bodies complicated the planning and decision 
making of the three operations examined. While the military crisis management was 
strictly conducted according to intergovernmental procedures, the civilian development 
and peace-building efforts for the long run were embedded in the supranational 
community. Even though EU member states, the Council General Secretariat, and the 
European Commission sought close coordination, the planning and decision making 
continued to be cumbersome and time-consuming. Moreover, even if the European 
Commission was willing to bring in its already existing programs, it remained reluctant 
concerning significant readjustments of its policies. Consequently, the institutional 
architecture and the coordination framework of the ESDP were not able to bridge the gap 
between the external activities of the Council of the EU, the European Commission, and 
EU member states. The new institutional arrangements under the Lisbon Treaty, 
including the creation of the new combined High Representative post and the 
establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), could be an important 
step on the way to overcome these difficulties. Whether these changes will succeed in 
this regard remains to be seen. 
However, a further problem arises from the enduring absence of a permanent 
Operation Headquarters. The case studies have confirmed prevalent observations that the 
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comprehensive planning did not always adequately address the most important elements 
of a possible military operation (e.g., the number of requested troops, the necessary 
means and capabilities, the operation’s expense and its duration).222 In the words of a 
CGS official: “When you plan something from Brussels at the strategic level, 
fundamentally there are three different things that member states would really like to 
know: how many troops, how much money, and how long?”223 In this regard, the early 
planning at the political and strategic level suffered from a lack of military-strategic and 
operational-level expertise. A permanent Operation Headquarters could provide the 
required input from the very beginning of the planning process and enhance the quality of 
the comprehensive planning documents. 
Third, the individual views and diverging interests of the EU member states posed 
a number of practical problems. Significant discord among the national governments 
concerned, for example, the question of burden sharing—an unending story. The 
planning and decision making of the three operations examined was significantly affected 
by the ways that the member states bargained with each other over the issues of who 
would do what for the joint action that all agreed was appropriate. While the member 
states quickly reached common ground concerning the need for comprehensiveness in 
these operations, they very hesitantly offered the requested forces and capabilities. 
Although the EU crisis management procedures set the stage for comprehensive planning 
and close coordination between member states and EU bodies, they could not substitute 
for a common understanding within the European Union.224 
A single EU member state may, in fact, be able to pave the way for the launch of 
a certain EU-led military operation. If the political influence is strong enough, the 
 
222 Among other sources, see Stuart Gordon, “Exploring the Civil–Military Interface and its Impact on 
European Strategic and Operational Personalities: 'Civilianisation' and Limiting Military Roles in 
Stabilisation Operations?” European Security 15, no. 3 (2006), 350–357; Knutsen, The EU and the 
Challenges of Civil–Military Coordination at the Strategic Level, 44–50; Simon, Command and Control? 
Planning for EU Military Operations, 39–45; Agnieszka Nowak, Civilian Crisis Management: The EU 
Way (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2006), 123–138. 
223 Quoted in Simon, Command and Control? Planning for EU Military Operations, 40. 
224 This problem concerns not only the EU’s security and defense policy. As this thesis is being 
concluded, contemporary events connected with the common currency and domestic politics make the issue 
examined in this study as urgent as ever, especially in a world that cannot secure lasting peace and for 
whom the burdens of security seem to increase steadily in the new century. 
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country may be able to get the operation accepted despite extensive reluctance among 
other EU member states. Yet, this national ability to sway EU decision making clearly 
ends when the force generation process begins. Notwithstanding solemn assurances about 
the merits of joint action, most EU member states remain unwilling to provide forces 
when common EU interests are not greatly at risk. From a realist point of view, the case 
of EUFOR Tchad/RCA can be seen as a French attempt to pursue distinct national 
interests in Africa through the EU’s security and defense policy. However, if the 
government in Paris had the aim of multiplying its power by EU means and shifting 
national burdens to other EU member states, the French policy failed. In the end, France 
was compelled to contribute most of the requested EU forces and capabilities and had to 
pay the lion’s share of the operation’s expense. 
On the other hand, despite the existing distinctions in national security cultures, 
public opinion in every EU member state shares a set of common interests and values. 
Even in skeptical countries, the EU’s security and defense policy and its comprehensive 
approach have become widely accepted by now.225 The European Security Strategy 
(ESS) actually constitutes a sustainable compromise between the EU member states. 
Although it does not provide a sound comprehensive security concept for crisis 
management, the main features of the ESS represent the nucleus of a common EU 
security culture. Accordingly, if a critical mass of member states comes to the conclusion 
that common EU interests are involved and that joint action is appropriate, reluctant 
governments have huge difficulties to avoid following the spearheading nations. The 
operations EUFOR RD Congo and EUNAVFOR Somalia have provided evidence in this 
regard. 
During the planning of EUFOR RD Congo, the EU member states unanimously 
agreed that joint action was appropriate. Germany was willing to support the peace 
process and the reconstruction efforts in the DRC, but it did not want to provide military 
forces and capabilities. Moreover, the government in Berlin did not aim to take a leading 
role in the operation. From a constructivist point of view, this attitude was, inter alia, 
caused by the German “culture of restraint,” which relied in particular on the rejection of 
 
225 Denmark, which does not participate in the EU’s security and defense policy, is the sole exception. 
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national military power projection and on civilian—virtually pacifist—sentiments within 
the public. However, Germany appeared to be the EU member state militarily most able 
to provide the Operation Headquarters (OHQ) and some of the needed forces. The 
government in Berlin therefore came under increasing pressure to adjust its power 
projection policy according to emerging EU norms and contribute with military 
capabilities to EUFOR RD Congo. Eventually, the German government hesitantly 
accepted a part of the leadership responsibility and offered a large portion of the 
requested forces, even though the public’s acceptance of national military power 
projection was slow. 
The planning and decision making of EUNAVFOR Somalia surprisingly led a 
“reluctant follower” of European integration—the United Kingdom—to accept a military 
leading role on the EU stage. The deliberations among the EU member states made it 
clear that the majority was willing to launch a common anti-piracy operation in the Gulf 
of Aden. The United Kingdom, however, would have preferred a NATO-led operation 
because both domestic policy-makers and the public remained hesitant regarding the 
EU’s military aspirations. In the face of increasing pressure from its EU partners, the 
government in London finally adjusted its position and thus paved the way for a general 
agreement among the EU member states. Subsequently, this change in policy made it 
possible for the United Kingdom to take a leading role in the first maritime operation 
under the aegis of the European Union. The fact that naval operations were a 
longstanding area of British competence and tradition might have facilitated London’s 
decision, a choice that represented a milestone in the development of the ESDP. 
Furthermore, the case studies have also shown that the ESDP was not designed to 
replace NATO or to balance US power. While NATO remained responsible for the 
territorial defense of its member nations, the United States of America persisted as the 
most important ally for the EU’s “big three,” France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. 
In this context, the case studies confirmed Jolyon Howorth’s observation that “whatever 
the EU eventually does autonomously will be broadly consistent with a harmonious 
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transatlantic relationship.”226 The ESDP actually served as an instrument to establish the 
European Union as an international security actor, but definitely not to challenge the 
United States. However, the inception of the CSDP and its new institutional arrangements 
could lead to stronger competition between the European Union and NATO in the field of 
security and defense. It is nevertheless probable that the CSDP will not eliminate the lack 
of political cohesiveness that characterized the ESDP. The US leadership, which 
facilitates consensus building in NATO, has no single-state equivalent in the European 
Union. Hence, the further development of the CSDP will depend on credible leadership 
through, for example, informal directorates or small-group collaboration among EU 
member states.  
Surprisingly enough, despite the fact that the EU member states pursued 
competing agendas, their national policies, taken together, advanced the EU’s security 
and defense policy for different reasons. While the ESDP offered Germany the 
opportunity to balance the tensions between its preferences for civil crisis management 
instruments on the one hand and for collective security on the other, for France it 
represented the fulfillment of a longstanding dream of national leaders. Simultaneously, 
France’s quest to promote and dominate this new field of EU policy encountered the 
United Kingdom’s reluctance to let Paris claim the sole leading role. As a result, even 
skeptical member states, which are well characterized as reluctant participants in the 
European integration process, played a significant role in the development and 
advancement of the EU’s security and defense policy.  
In sum, the European Union has reached a common understanding of 
comprehensive security based on an admittedly limited set of shared values and interests. 
There is broad support among the EU member states for the integration of civil and 
military instruments, the active prevention of conflict and instability, the pursuit of 
multilateral and rule-based cooperation, and the definition of a global scope of action. 
There is evidence that military operations have the potential to add value to the EU’s 
 
226 Jolyon Howorth, “A Work in Progress,” Harvard International Review 27, no. 4 (2006), 83. 
 82
comprehensive approach to security. Nevertheless, the implementation of this holistic and 
normative approach is still hampered for the different reasons analyzed in this thesis.  
The thesis has identified three decisive factors for the improvement of the EU’s 
comprehensive approach to security. First, the European Union needs a sound concept 
through which its plethora of civil and military tools could be seamlessly integrated and 
synchronized into a truly coherent and comprehensive approach to crisis management. 
Second, the European Union could benefit from the establishment of a permanent 
Operation Headquarters (whether a genuine military or a civil-military OHQ) providing 
the required input from the very beginning of the comprehensive planning process for 
crisis management. Third, the EU’s security and defense policy could become more 
coherent and capable if small groups of credible nations cooperated to offer leadership, 
perhaps in informal directorates. The key question in this respect remains whether and 
how the European Union can address the friction between the need for effective 
leadership on the one hand and the imperative of political legitimacy on the other. 
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